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IS THE RULE OF LAW POSSIBLE IN
A POSTMODERN WORLD?
Francis J. Mootz III*
Abstract: The Rule of Law is the core of our political and legal ideology, but the Rule of
Law increasingly is attacked as an unattainable goal. Postmoder theorists challenge
whether it makes sense to believe that rules can be formulated for general application and
then later neutrally applied by decision makers. Postmodern theorists reject the Enlight-
enment world view and its political corollary, classical liberalism. The author agrees with
the spirit of the postmoder critique, but argues that we can understand the Rule of Law
in a manner consonant with postmodern thought. Drawing on the Continental tradition
of hermeneutics, or the philosophy of interpretation, the Rule of Law is reformulated in
accordance with the insights of the post-Enlightenment era.
This article first reviews Dean Geoffrey Walker's recent attempt to defend the Rule of
Law from a post-Enlightenment perspective. Dean Walker describes the emerging post-
Enlightenment world view as it is reflected in disparate fields that include quantum phys-
ics and Taoism. However, Dean Walker's approach remains wedded to Enlightenment
conceptions. His efforts can only serve as the springboard for a more productive herme-
neutical inquiry.
The Enlightenment vision of rational, insular subjects decoding the objective world does
not accurately portray the experience of understanding and knowing. Given that the natu-
ral sciences are now viewed as irremediably intersubjective and interpretive practices, it is
no surprise that legal practice has been stripped of its formalist pretensions. The author
describes how this inescapable hermeneutical situation does not preclude the Rule of Law,
but rather is the very foundation of the Rule of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
Postmodernism is all the rage. Discussions concerning the culture
of postmodernity and the significance of postmodern thought fill an
increasing number of pages in leading law reviews, and postmodern-
ism dominates contemporary legal theory.1 Postmodern thought is
best understood as a critique of the philosophical biases of the modem
era. This postmodern critique generally adopts the ibllowing charac-
terization of modernity. Modem thinkers premise rational thought on
a knowing subject who organizes and is able to make sense of the
world of objects. The legacy of Cartesian doubt crystallizes this prem-
ise of modernity: The indubitable presence of ourselves as thinking
subjects is the firm ground of all knowledge. The Cartesian approach
bifurcates the world of objects and the cogito, thereby rendering all
knowledge subject to the skeptical rejoinder that we can never be cer-
tain that our thoughts are mirroring the world of objects accurately.
The jurisprudence of modernity similarly rests on the subject/object
distinction. Under the modem view, rules are regarded as particular
objects that direct the legal subject in the exercise of his function as
judge, administrator, or advocate.2
1. Recent articles have stressed the need to clarify what the t.-rm "postmodernism"
encompasses. "Postmodernity" is the term used to characterize the contemporary cultural
milieu, which critics view as superficial, fragmented, and disconnected from a substantive
tradition of ethical and political knowledge. Products of this culture, such as MTV, are
described as "postmoder." The anti-foundationalist philosophical orientations that have
developed as part of this culture collectively are termed "postmoder thought." For an overview
of this terminology in the legal literature, see J.M. Balkin, VWiat Is a Postmodern
Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1966 (1992), and Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/
Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 254 (1992). For my observations on some problems
inherent in Balkin's definitional approach, see Francis J. Mcotz III, Postmodern
Constitutionalism as Materialism, 91 MICH. L. REv. 515 (1992).
Although we can define postmodern thought generally as "anti-foundationalist," there is no
fixed postmodern dogma or canon. Postmodern thought encompasses various contemporary
"styles of thought sharing philosophical commitments to anti-foundationlism, immanence [and]
historicity .... As they are practiced now, poststructuralism and pragmatism are postmoderist
jurisprudences, as (largely) are feminism and critical race theory." Margaret J. Radin & Frank
Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1019,
1024 n.30 (1991). Of course, not all feminist scholarship is postmoder. For a good description
of how feminism can be practiced in either a modem or postmodern way, see Dennis Patterson,
supra. For examples ofpostmoder legal thought, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary
Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L.
REv. 707 (1991); Postmodernism and Law: A Symposium, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 433 (1991);
Symposium: The Critique of Normativity, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 801 (1991).
2. Justice Antonin Scalia recently articulated a thoroughly modernist perspective of the Rule
of Law in The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989). Professor
Margaret Radin identifies the "philosophical underpinning" of modern approaches to the Rule of
Law as consisting of the following assumptions:
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Postmodern theorists argue that modernity no longer provides a
useful description of our place in the world, which they view as an
indeterminate, intersubjective network of meanings. A striking feature
of much postmodern legal thought, particularly its post-structuralist
variant, is its flat rejection of the possibility of the Rule of Law.
Postmodern scholars view language as indeterminate and social prac-
tices as historically contingent. Consequently, there is no firm founda-
tion upon which a theory of rule-governed behavior can rest. The
Rule of Law becomes an unavoidable casualty of postmodernity to the
extent that the Rule of Law requires determinate objective rules that
function as guides for insular and secure interpretive subjects. Joseph
Singer describes the impact of postmodern antifoundationalism in
stark terms, arguing that if "traditional legal theorists are correct
about the importance of determinacy to the rule of law, then-by their
own criteria-the rule of law has never existed anywhere." 3 Allan
Hutchinson echoes this theme with an uncompromising attack:
The Rule of Law is a sham; the esoteric and convoluted nature of legal
doctrine is an accommodating screen to obscure its indeterminacy and
the inescapable element of judicial choice. Traditional lawyering is a
clumsy and repetitive series of bootstrap arguments and legal discourse
is only a stylized version of political discourse.4
The postmodern critique undoubtedly is provocative and stimulating
in its characterization of the Rule of Law as a myth, but the ramifica-
tions of attacking the heart of the legitimating ideology of Western
political theory are far reaching and not to be suffered lightly. Per-
haps the most important question facing contemporary legal theory is
whether it is inevitable that the Rule of Law pass away like other
unhelpful relics of modernity, such as originalism or the plain meaning
doctrine,5 or whether we can understand the Rule of Law in a manner
consonant with postmodern thought. If the growing number of critics
(1) law consists of rules; (2) rules are prior to particular cases, more general than particular
cases, and applied to particular cases; (3) law is instrumental (the rules are applied to
achieve ends); (4) there is a radical separation between government and citizens (there are
rule-givers and appliers, versus rule-takers and compliers); (5) the person is a rational
chooser ordering her affairs instrumentally.
Margaret J. Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 792 (1989). Radin
criticizes this modem view from a Wittgensteinian perspective, which is closely related to, yet
different from, the hermeneutical approach that I develop in this Article.
3. Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1,
14 (1984).
4. ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, DWELLING ON THE THRESHOLD: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON
MODERN LEGAL THOUGHT 40 (1988).
5. I argue that contemporary hermeneutics is a postmodem philosophical effort that properly
discredits both originalism and plain meaning in Francis J. Mootz III, The Ontological Basis of
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who argue that postmodern thought undermines at least the tradi-
tional understanding of the Rule of Law are correct, the question nev-
ertheless remains: Is the Rule of Law possible in a postmodern world?
Discussing the relationship between postmodernism and the Rule of
Law is not idle academic chatter. The postmodern challenge to the
possibility of the Rule of Law strikes to the core of our political self-
understanding. The idea of the Rule of Law (albeit in different form
and context) extends back to the genesis of modem Western thought
in ancient Greece, and therefore it implicates much of the Western
tradition of legal and political philosophy. 6  The Rule of Law contin-
ues to play an embattled central role in contemporary jurisprudence as
a focus in the modem exchanges between positivists, realists, natural
law theorists and critical theorists. Nevertheless, the contemporary
debate increasingly has shifted from the question of what the Rule of
Law entails to the question of whether the idea of the Rule of Law is
coherent in light of postmodern critiques of language and subjectivity.
There is a growing consensus that postmodernity spells the end of the
Rule of Law, although there is less agreement about the character of
postmodern legal practice.7
Given the seemingly oxymoronic quality of the term "postmodern,"
in this Article I adopt the more descriptive label "post-Enlighten-
ment" to describe the emerging intellectual climate.' Characterizing
postmodem thought as a response to the inadequacies of the Enlight-
enment era helps to clarify the challenge to the Rule of Law. The
Enlightenment goal of objective (scientific) knowledge has spawned an
Legal Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas and
Ricouer, 68 B.U. L. REv. 523 (1988).
6. F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 162-75 (1960); Fred Dallmayr,
Hermeneutics and the Rule of Law, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 1449, 1451 (1990) (explaining that the
intellectual roots of liberal political institutions are linked to Greek philosophy). The tension
between the supposed antinomies of justice and the Rule of Law reaches back to the contrasting
visions of political order in Plato's writings. In Plato's Republic, justice is realized in the rule of
philosopher-kings; in Plato's Laws, Plato deems a rule-governed society as preeminent.
ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE 22-23 (1990); H.
Malcolm Macdonald, Government Under Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 3-4 (Arthur L. Harding
ed., 1961).
7. I have described the work of Pierre Schlag as radically deconstructive in this regard, and in
response, I have articulated a postmodern response grounded in Gadamer's philosophical
hermeneutics. See Francis J. Mootz III, Rethinking the Rule of Law: A Demonstration that the
Obvious Is Plausible (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Washington Law Review).
8. I share Marshall Berman's dislike for the term "postmoder," primarily because I believe
that our culture is still in the throes of modernity even as we move away from Enlightenment
epistemological foundations. See MARSHALL BERMAN, ALL THAT IS SOLID MELTS INTO AIR:
THE EXPERIENCE OF MODERNITY 15-36 (1982) (arguing that modernity stretches from the
sixteenth century to the present, and that epochal shifts mark the manner in which we define and




ethos that is indelibly inscribed in our attitudes, actions, and theories.
Within the disciplines of law and political theory the Enlightenment
ethos is manifested as liberalism: the belief that individual subjects join
together to form a community defined by rational public strictures and
a wide sphere of private, subjective autonomy. This vision of individ-
ual subjects as the seat of knowledge and morality is no longer satis-
factory. In this century, we have come to see that the Enlightenment
project has failed because it established the scientific model of knowl-
edge as the only legitimate source of understanding, thereby denigrat-
ing our actual mode of understanding which extends beyond the limits
of science. The Enlightenment picture of rational, self-contained
knowing subjects does not accurately portray the experience of under-
standing and knowing, as evidenced by the dramatic admission that
even the natural sciences are irremediably intersubjective, interpretive
projects that do not involve detached and neutral investigations of
objects.9 If we no longer view the natural sciences as objective, rule-
bound enterprises, the possibility for sustaining the Rule of Law
appears dim.
This Article rejects the idea that the Rule of Law is possible only if
we embrace Enlightenment conceptions of knowledge. Post-Enlight-
enment thought does not destroy the possibility of the Rule of Law.
To the contrary, it provides a necessary corrective to the Enlighten-
ment presuppositions that have rendered the doctrine of the Rule of
Law problematic in the first place. The Continental tradition of philo-
sophical hermeneutics, best exemplified in the work of Hans-Georg
Gadamer, exhibits post-Enlightenment thinking in a manner that does
not preclude the possibility of the Rule of Law.1 Viewed from
9. Important seminal works by members of the scientific community include THOMAS S.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962), and MICHAEL POLANYI,
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1958). David Bohm
describes the impact of the theory of relativity and quantum theory on our preconceptions of
scientists as neutral observers by arguing that "both observer and observed are merging and
interpenetrating aspects of one whole reality, which is indivisible and unanalysable." DAVID
BOHM, WHOLENESS AND THE IMPLICATE ORDER 9 (1980). Bohm states further:
As relativity and quantum theory have shown that it has no meaning to divide the
observing apparatus from what is observed, so the considerations discussed here indicate
that it has no meaning to separate the observed fact (along with the instruments used to
observe it) from the theoretical notions of order that help to give 'shape' to this fact. ...
Fact and theory are thus seen to be different aspects of one whole in which analysis into
separate but interacting parts is not relevant. That is to say, not only is undivided wholeness
implied in the content of physics (notably relativity and quantum theory) but also in the
manner of working in physics.
Id. at 143.
10. In this Article, I rely principally on Gadamer's magnum opus, HANS-GEORG GADAMER,
TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. Crossroad
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Gadamer's perspective, however, our traditional conception of the
Rule of Law must radically be revised to the point that many would
argue that the Rule of Law has in fact been discarded. The challenge
of post-Enlightenment thought cannot be met by simply reaffirming
the comforting vision of the Rule of Law that animates the Enlighten-
ment perspective. By following Gadamer's lead we will not overcome
the post-Enlightenment challenge as much as engage it and struggle
with it.
Mainstream scholars continue to defend the Rule of Law without
addressing the radical critique of post-Enlightenment thought."1
These scholars undoubtedly believe that accepting post-Enlightenment
thought is tantamount to abandoning the Rule of Law. I set the stage
Publishing 1989) (1960). For other important works by Gadamer, see HANs-GEORG GADAMER,
DIALOGUE AND DIALECTIC: EIGHT HERMENEUTICAL STUDIES ON FLATO (P. Christopher
Smith trans., Yale University Press 1980) (1934-74); HANS-GEORG GADkMER, PHILOSOPHICAL
APPRENTICESHIPS (Robert R. Sullivan trans., MIT Press 1985) (1977); HANS-GEORG
GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS (David E. Linge trans. & ed., University of
California Press 1976) (1962-72).
Leading secondary sources that discuss Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics include
RICHARD J. BERNSTIEN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS,
AND PRAXIS (1988); P. CHRISTOPHER SMITH, HERMENEUTICS AND HUMAN FINITUDE:
TOWARD A THEORY OF ETHICAL UNDERSTANDING (1991); GEORGIA WARNKE, GADAMER:
HERMENEUTIcS, TRADITION AND REASON (1987); JOEL C. WEINSHEIMER, GADAMER'S
HERMENEUTICS: A READING OF TRUTH A.ND METHOD (1985); and FESTIVALS OF
INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS ON HANS-GEORG GADAMER'S WORK (Kathleen Wright ed., 1990).
Leading secondary works relating Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics to legal philosophy
include LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992);
Dallmayr, supra note 6; Stephen M. Feldman, The New Metaphysics: 7he Interpretive Turn in
Jurisprudence, 76 IOWA L. REV. 661 (1991); Kenneth Henley, Protestant Hermeneutics and the
Rule of Law: Gadamer and Dworkin, 3 RATIO JURIS 14 (1990); Gregory Leyh, Dworkin's
Hermeneutics, 39 MERCER L. REV. 851 (1988); Mootz, supra note 5; George Wright, On a
General Theory of Interpretation: The Betti-Gadamer Dispute in Legal Hermeneutics, 32 AM. J.
JURIS. 191 (1987); and Mootz, supra note 7.
This Article starts with the presumption that post-Enlightenment thought is productive and
discusses what post-Enlightenment jurisprudence should look like when based on Gadamer's
philosophical hermeneutics. In this short Article, I do not defend my presumption against the
Enlightenment model, but my efforts in this regard may be found in Mo:tz, supra note 5. For
the reader who finds all this talk about postmodernism to be quite ridiculous, I hope the Article
still serves a useful and interesting function by defending the Rule of Lt.w from a postmodern
perspective, thereby blunting some of the excesses of postmodernism.
11. An interesting case in point is Ronald Dworkin. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE (1986). Dworkin makes an elegant argument against legal positivism that can appeal to
modernists and postmodernists alike. Thus, it is quite possible to connect Dworkin's
descriptions of "law as integrity" and "constructive interpretation" to ,ome of the themes of
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. Leyh, supra note 10, at 857-65. Nevertheless, Dworkin
does not embrace Gadamer's metaphysical arguments and in many respects can be read as
rejecting Gadamer's full-bodied notion of the historicity of knowledge, especially when Dworkin
makes the ambiguous claim that there are right answers to every legal dispute. Dworkin, supra,
at viii-ix (defending his "right answer" thesis, although admitting that no right answer to a
particular legal dispute can be proved as such to every member of the community).
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for my discussion of the relevance of Gadamer's hermeneutics to the
Rule of Law by examining a recent attempt to embrace post-Enlight-
enment thought that does not surrender the view that the Rule of Law
is a coherent doctrine. In The Rule of Law: Foundation of Constitu-
tional Democracy,1 2 Dean Geoffrey de Q. Walker undertakes to
defend a traditional conception of the Rule of Law both as a tradition
worthy of respect and a political ideal that is necessary for the emerg-
ing post-Enlightenment world. Walker succinctly states that the "rule
of law is not a complete formula for the good society, but there can be
no good society without it."' 3 To a significant degree, Walker adheres
to familiar liberal tenets by arguing that the Rule of Law is desirable
because it provides the stable backdrop (empirical fact) against which
individuals can pursue their own projects (subjective values) in a man-
ner that facilitates social growth. Friedrich A. Hayek provides a bet-
ter elaboration of this modernist conception of the Rule of Law, and
Hayek's work plainly forms a primary inspiration for Walker's pro-
ject.14 However, Walker's book is not simply a nostalgic recapitula-
tion of traditional visions of liberalism because he recognizes that the
Enlightenment model is now seriously discredited and therefore can
not sustain the Rule of Law. Today Hayek is regarded by many as an
outdated capitalist apologist, but Walker undertakes to rehabilitate
Hayek's thesis by demonstrating the possibility and benefits of adher-
ing to the Rule of Law in a post-Enlightenment world. Walker
attempts to reinvigorate the Rule of Law by projecting it beyond the
Enlightenment perspective that until recently shaped its contours.
Walker's effort merits a close critical assessment because he pur-
ports to engage postmodern critics on their own terms. Walker does
not ignore the fundamental challenges of post-Enlightenment thought;
instead, he sets out to demonstrate that it is the critics of the Rule of
12. GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW: FOUNDATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY (1988).
13. Id. at 42.
14. This is confirmed explicitly by Walker's acknowledgement of his indebtedness to
Professor Hayek, id. at xxvi. Hayek is known principally for his writings in support of a
radically laissez-faire economic system, but the concomitant requirement of a liberal political
order occupied much of his later career. Hayek encapsulates the Rule of Law thus:
Stripped of all technicalities, this means that government in all its actions is bound by rules
fixed and announced beforehand-rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty
how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one's
individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944). Hayek's principle work in the area
is F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960). His last and most definitive statement
on the subject of the Rule of Law is 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES
AND ORDER (1973).
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Law who fail to appreciate the full dimensions of past-Enlightenment
theory. However, my assessment of Walker's theory leads me to con-
clude that it can only serve as a bridge to the truly post-Enlightenment
discourse embodied in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. This
Article critically assesses Walker's attempt to preserve the Rule of
Law by embracing the post-Enlightenment condition and concludes
that Walker's effort falls short because he remains planted firmly in
the Enlightenment model of knowledge despite his best efforts to break
free. Walker's thesis serves as a clarion call to initiate a post-Enlight-
enment discourse, but the result of his effort serves as a warning that
half measures will not suffice. Walker's project to recast the Rule of
Law is a necessary one that should be carried forward more produc-
tively. Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is an appropriate start-
ing point for such a project.
This Article is organized in two parts. In part one, I review
Walker's attempt to abandon the Enlightenment picture of the world
without abandoning the traditional conception of the Rule of Law as a
bulwark against arbitrary assertions of political power. I first discuss
Walker's definition of the Rule of Law, in which he attempts to
accomplish the seemingly irreconcilable goals of constraining legal
actors while also providing the necessary flexibility for modernization.
I then connect Walker's definition of the Rule of Law with his concep-
tion of post-Enlightenment thought. Finally, I present Walker's
indictment of current legal practice for abandoning the Rule of Law
during the transition to a post-Enlightenment world when it is most
needed.
In part two, I criticize Walker for failing to embrace the radical
character of the post-Enlightenment challenge. I argue that Walker's
rather unique approach of blending classical liberalism with the les-
sons to be drawn from quantum physics and Taoism locates his
defense of the Rule of Law in contemporary intellectual currents, but
that his approach fails to measure up to the task. Walker embraces
the liberating possibilities of post-Enlightenment physics, but he
remains wedded to Enlightenment metaphysics, thereby precluding an
effective defense of the Rule of Law. I then demonstrate that
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics provides the post-Enlighten-
ment discourse best suited for cultivating a better appreciation of the
dialogic character of legal practice and for redefining the Rule of Law




I. DEAN WALKER'S POST-ENLIGHTENMENT DEFENSE
OF THE RULE OF LAW
In this part of the Article, I describe Walker's efforts to reinvigorate
the Rule of Law. First, I review Walker's definition of the doctrine.
After establishing this background, I present Walker's understanding
of the post-Enlightenment challenge. Walker's definition of the Rule
of Law purports to incorporate the lessons of post-Enlightenment
thought, and so it is necessary to connect his definition with his con-
ception of the emerging world view. Finally, I describe Walker's pre-
scription for preserving the Rule of Law as a political reality in order
to assure our safe passage to a post-Enlightenment world.
A. Defining the Rule of Law
Contemporary Rule of Law jurisprudence reflects the tension
between acknowledging that a simplistic "rule book" approach to law
must be discarded and yet still attempting to reinforce the legal sys-
tem's privileged status as a rational enterprise not reducible to bare
ethics or politics. 5 On one hand, we acknowledge that linguistic inde-
15. See ALTM AN, supra note 6, at 27-56 (considering the works of H.L.A. Hart, Ronald
Dworkin and Rolf Sartorius as three different responses to the collapse of the "rule book" picture
of law, a collapse that results from the fact that in late capitalist societies laws often are no more
than vague principles that not only require but invite the discretion of courts and administrative
agencies charged with enforcing the laws). Although contemporary jurisprudence involves the
continuing struggle to define legal practice in a new manner, many legal practitioners continue to
employ the old terminology. As one commentator notes, the Supreme Court Justices "have not
been reading their Derrida," resulting in a gap between jurisprudential theses and the language of
judicial opinions. Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of
Plain Meaning, 1990 Sup. Cr. REv. 231, 231.
Justice Scalia's efforts to clarify the appropriate method for interpreting legal texts exemplify
the persistance of modernist, Enlightenment strategies. Scalia endorses the assumption that the
meaning of a legal rule exists prior to the application of the rule to a particular dispute, by virtue
of the plain meaning of the words used to state the rule. If there is no plain meaning that can be
applied to the case at hand, the judge is left to decide the dispute on grounds other than the rule.
See Scalia, supra note 2, at 1187 ("All I urge is that [fact-based, discretionary] modes of analysis
be avoided where possible; that the Rule of Law, the law of rules, be extended as far as the nature
of the question allows. ... ). Lending jurisprudential support to Scalia's plain meaning
approach is Frederick Schauer's careful and precise extension of the claim that meaning is
distinct from application. Schauer, supra; Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14
HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'y 645, 657-65 (1991) (defending a "presumptive positivism" that
respects the importance of plain meaning in legal interpretation).
For persuasive criticisms of these efforts to rehabilitate plain meaning, see William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990) (extending his analysis of a
Gadamerian approach to statutory interpretation); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of
Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REv. 533, 546-49
(1992) (arguing that Scalia's approach is qualified sufficiently that it does not resuscitate full-
bodied plain meaning, and that Schauer's presumptive preference to enforce plain meaning
inevitably will be overcome in a large number of cases); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's
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terminacy does not permit hard and fast "rules" that can be known
and followed regardless of the context or the interpreter's perspective.
On the other hand, we do not view legal practice simply as the exercise
of judgment by those in power, who may or may not judge correctly
according to then prevailing conceptions of justice. Walker attempts
to define the Rule of Law in a way that mediates this opposition.
Walker rejects a normative, or "values," approach to the Rule of
Law under which "the rule of law has no meaning unless it expressly
recognizes certain fundamental human rights."' 16 Instead, he adopts
an "institutions-principles-procedures" approach that focuses on the
process by which the normative goals developed by a society are
implemented through the legal system. 7 Walker's distinction between
a values approach and an institutions approach rests on the distinction
at the heart of liberal political theory, the perceived contrast between
the model of the positive state (which exists to enable individuals to
develop their capacities fully) and the model of the negative state
(which exists only to protect social organization from dysfunction)."8
Walker's explicit goal in following the latter approach is to insulate
formal, legal arrangements from prior normative conflicts in society,
thereby serving the dual purpose of ensuring the insular integrity of
the legal system and also freeing the ongoing dynamics of social organ-
ization from the strictures of the legal system. It is necessary to
retrace Walker's definitional structure in some detail in order to
understand the motivations for his approach.
Walker's institutional approach drives his description of the
problems that the Rule of Law must address. Primarily, a government
must ensure civil order by outlawing private coercion and by enforcing
this prohibition.' 9 The Hobbesian state of nature must be tamed to
allow a measure of self-determination and self-governance among the
citizenry. The requirement of law and order is not the full extent of
the doctrine's scope, however, because the leviath.n government of
civil society must also be subject to the law, which i:acludes both con-
stitutional limits on governmental power as well as the equal applica-
tion of general laws to agents of the government.20 In short, the Rule
Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1597 (1991) (critiquing
Scalia's plain meaning jurisprudence).
16. WALKER, supra note 12, at 11.
17. Id. at 9-11, 23-42.
18. Id.
19. This is expressed in point 1, Laws against private coercion, and point 5, Enforcement of
laws against private coercion. Id. at 24, 28-29.
20. This is expressed in point 2, Government under law, and point 6, Enforcement of
government under law principle. Id. at 24-25, 29.
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of Law must be superior to both governed and governor. If every
member of society equally is subject to preestablished rules embodied
in institutional structures, then presumably those persons who attain
political power will not be in a position to impose their subjective will
on others in the community. Implicit in this view is the belief that
legal rules are objective things distinct from the subjective actors who
are confronted by them, even if the rules do not form a tightly knit
rule book of unambiguous commands that control the subjective
actors.21
Walker reinforces the distinction between objective rules and subjec-
tive actors by making the familiar argument that all laws, regardless of
content, must be certain (knowable, prospective, and relatively stable),
be generally applied, and treat all citizens equally, so that they can
serve as guides for future conduct.2 2 Walker believes that a separation
of powers is necessary to ensure that laws retain these characteristics,
both in their promulgation and enforcement. A vitally important
requirement is ready access to an independent court system that can
adjudicate disputes arising between citizens or between a citizen and
the government. 23 In turn, the linchpin of the court system is a judici-
ary independent of the government and yet still "bound by law."24
Finally, Walker adopts the term "natural justice" to refer to the mini-
mal structural features that a legal system would have to incorporate
to sustain the Rule of Law, including the traditions of unbiased tribu-
nals, open court sessions, and a presumption of innocence in criminal
trials.25 Because Walker recognizes that a bare description of institu-
tions and principles does not address the problem of government
"under law" except in the most superficial and tautological way, he
relies on the dynamic practice of adjudication to implement the fea-
tures of the Rule of Law. Nevertheless, Walker believes that the heart
of this adjudicative practice is the existence of clear, general and pro-
21. In this respect, Walker does not differ from most contemporary theorists, who reflect
positivist assumptions even as they recognize that the historical movement to positivism is spent.
See supra note 15.
22. This is expressed in point 3, Certainty, generality, equality. WALKER, supra note 12, at
25-27.
23. This is expressed in point 7, Independence of the judiciary, point 8, Independent legal
profession, and point 10, Accessibility of courts. Id. at 29-37, 40.
24. Id. at 31-32. Walker admits that the belief that judges should find the law rather than
make it has certainly been discredited by the realists, but he retains the spirit of the proposition
as a statement of the proper attitude that the judge should adopt, namely humility for her own
limitations and attentiveness to the tradition preceding her. See infra notes 83-86 and
accompanying text.
25. This is expressed in point 9, Natural justice; impartial tribunal& WALKER, supra note 12,
at 37-40.
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spective rules by which people can order their lives and according to
which their disputes may be judged.
Walker's decision to follow a formalistic institutional approach is
not without equivocation, however. Walker's definition of the Rule of
Law also introduces a normative dimension that is not captured by a
purely procedural or positivist perspective. Walker quotes with
approval Joseph Raz's effort to differentiate between "the rule of law"
and "the rule of good law,"' 26 but he recognizes substantive limits on
laws by requiring that they be generally congruent with prevailing
social values.27 Walker's institutional definition of the Rule of Law
eschews a wholly "value" approach that would attempt to identify
fundamental human rights that are entailed by the :Rule of Law, pri-
marily because he believes that any such attempt would inappropri-
ately reify certain social practices of Western democracies.2" But
Walker also rejects the extreme positivist view that the Rule of Law
simply means law and order (according to which the Rule of Law
prevailed in juristic yet evil Nazi Germany) and the equally limited
view that it is simply a requirement that the government be subject to
26. Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 3, 4
(Robert L. Cunningham ed., 1979). Raz argues:
If the rule of law is the rule of the good law, then to explain its nature is to propound a
complete social philosophy. But then the term lacks any useful function. We have no need
to be converted to the rule of law in order to discover that to believe in it is to believe that
good should triumph.
Id. at 4. See generally JOSEPH RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM (1980). Thus, Walker
is echoing Raz when he posits principles of natural justice that must be observed if the Rule of
Law is to exist, WALKER, supra note 12, at 10, but expressly goes beyond both Raz and John
Rawls when he claims that the substantive limit of public morality is a feature of the Rule of
Law. Id. at 19, 23. It becomes clear later in his discussion that Walker regards the move as a
necessary one to preserve the dynamic quality of the Rule of Law.
27. This is expressed in point 4, General congruence of law with social value& WALKER, supra
note 12, at 27-28. Walker hedges this step, but he certainly takes it.
In a sense we may be cheating a little by making this ... point an element or a part of the
definition. Strictly speaking, it is a limit of the model, not an ingredient of it. The rule of
law could theoretically exist without this requirement being satisfied. But, for the reasons
given, it would not last long. Since we are interested in actual practice, we would therefore
be wrong to accept a definition that would dignify as examples of the rule of law mere
passing interludes of institutionalized legality. This ... requirement is, therefore, of such
vital importance that even if it is properly described as a limit of the model, it should as a
practical matter form part of the definition.
Id. at 28.
28. Walker believes that the Rule of Law could be realized in (non-totalitarian) communist or
Islamic states, and would implicate wholly different patterns of rights and obligations among
members of these societies. Id. at 11-14. In this respect, he differs markedly from Hayek, whose
theory of the Rule of Law was grounded in the necessity of a free maket capitalist economic
system. Walker's broader notion of the fundamental values underlying the concept of the Rule
of Law is undoubtedly the result of his focus on the challenges of a future post-capitalist, post-
Enlightenment society, although I argue that he doesn't go far enough. See infra part II.A.
260
Rule of Law
the rule book of laws.2 9 Walker admits the need for some substantive
limitation on laws if the notion of the Rule of Law is to have any
content for real world applications, which leads him to constrain legal
authority not only with institutional protections but also by requiring
that laws exhibit a general substantive congruence with social values.
Because this move explicitly undercuts the distinction between the
positive rule embedded in empirical legal institutions and the substan-
tive goal of value-laden politics, it is important to examine in greater
detail the manner in which Walker distinguishes institutional/proce-
dural principles of natural justice from the substantive limitations of
"social values."
Walker defines principles of natural justice as the minimal and basic
institutional protections necessary to preserve the other elements of
the Rule of Law from becoming a "hollow mockery," and so these
principles do not suggest a full-scale social theory of human rights."0
In this way, Walker follows Hayek's principle of spontaneous order,
under which society is viewed as the complex result of individuals
interacting in a way that could never be dictated by a centralized plan-
ning authority.31 The principle of spontaneous order most frequently
is used to justify a laissez-faire economic system, but it is also a central
pillar of classical liberal political theory because it privileges individu-
als as the ultimate domain of reality rather than society. Hayek rejects
any attempt to enact social justice through positive law because the
planning authority can never acquire the infinite pieces of information
necessary to choreograph the social order, but he does believe that the
guiding value of individual freedom demands that principled condi-
tions be met in social organization.32 The Rule of Law, then, is the
implementation of conditions under which people may pursue their
29. WALKER, supra note 12, at 3-4.
30. Id. at 5. For example, keeping courtrooms open to the public is a socially contingent
practice that Walker believes is a requirement of natural justice, because he can not conceive of
how the Rule of Law could be realized without this institutional feature. Walker's point is that
the institutional approach to defining the Rule of Law "is concerned with values and purposes
only in so far as they are inherent in the institutions that support the rule of law." Id. at 11.
31. Hayek connects the Rule of Law to the principle of spontaneous order most clearly in his
later work, Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order. See HAYEK, supra note 14.
32.
We shall see that it is impossible, not only to replace the spontaneous order by
organization and at the same time to utilize as much of the dispersed knowledge of all its
members as possible, but also to improve or correct this order by interfering in it by direct
commands....
.. [Although we can endeavour to improve a spontaneous order by revising the general
rules on which it rests and can supplement its results by the efforts of various organizations
[such as government, a man-made order], we can not improve the results by specific
commands that deprive its members of the possibility of using their knowledge for their
purposes.
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individual projects, secure in the knowledge that a stable system girds
their freely chosen social interaction. In Walker's view, only those
institutional features that are necessary to this general framework con-
stitute principles of natural justice.
Institutional principles of natural justice implicate political and
social values only in a very general sense. However, Walker does not
limit his definition of the Rule of Law to the narrowly circumscribed
principles of natural justice. Although contemporary social values do
not constitute principles of natural justice, they do stand as an
independent check on legal authority. Positive law enacted by govern-
ments has the limited function of helping to create the conditions in
which a free and spontaneous social order can develop, and so these
laws must not diverge significantly from contemporary social values.
Walker's anti-positivist theme is clear: the customs and values of the
citizens rather than the commands of the government are the makers
of true law.3 3 It is imperative that the legal system :Facilitate and also
mirror social customs and values, which it does best through the jury
system and common law adjudication. 4 With his "democratic theory
of law," Walker rejects the belief that future arrangements of custom-
ary laws can be anticipated, promulgated, and enforced by govern-
ment. Instead, the legal order must facilitate the continual evolution
of social values and then keep pace with the developmental path.
Walker's distinction between natural justice and social values, and
the important status of both in his theory, evidences a paradoxical atti-
tude. Walker does not attempt to reduce the Rule of Law solely to a
theory of institutionalized rule-following because a self-implementing
rule book is impossible to achieve. Nevertheless, he does reject the
elitism inherent in prescribing the "proper" values ta be respected by
society, and he attempts to protect the free development of social val-
... We can never produce a crystal or a complex organic compound by placing the
individual atoms in such a position that they will form the lattice of a crystal or the system
based on benzol rings which make up an organic compound. But we can create the
conditions in which they will arrange themselves in such a manner.
Id. at 51, 39-40.
33. WALKER, supra note 12, at 361-62.
34. Id. at 364, 366. Walker scorns the legislature as an embodiment of the problems
threatening the Rule of Law and argues that direct citizen intervention by means of the
procedures of initiative and referendum is necessary. Id. at 367. Although he explicitly adopts
Lon Fuller's preference for adjudication over legislation, it is obvious that a system of
representative democracy with regular elections goes a long way toward keeping legislation in
general congruence with social values. Even still, Walker regards the judiciary as the necessary





ues from legal analysis by arguing that social values can only unfold
naturally against the backdrop of the legal order." The model of
spontaneous order requires that certain very basic "rules" establish the
boundaries for unplanned interactions that create the law of the com-
munity. In Walker's view, the Rule of Law demands both a short,
fundamental rule book and a vibrant and indeterminate social practice
generating ethical values to guide society.
By incorporating contemporary social values into his definition,
Walker appears subject to the standard criticism directed at Hayek: It
is all well and good to speak of the spontaneous order of society, but
the effect is to justify existing political and economic inequality and to
posit the laissez-faire market regime as an ultimate and universal
social value.36 However, Walker's approach does not parallel
Hayek's. Hayek's model of the spontaneous order is self-consciously
and thoroughly value-laden, celebrating a traditional understanding of
individual liberty as the preeminent value to be advanced.3" In
Walker's terminology, Hayek divorces his overriding normative com-
35. Walker does not expend much effort to buttress the normative foundation for his analysis.
Critiquing fundamental ordering values presumably is a project for ethical and political theory,
and Walker plainly regards it as a mistake to subsume these problems under the Rule of Law.
Once again, this is an unabashed liberal position because it rests on the methodological
distinction between institutional facts and guiding values. For example, Richard Epstein
divorces Hayek's traditional approach from its normative underpinning by contending that there
is
a clear need to go beyond the form of a law to decide whether it is just or wise, and a
normative theory of human behavior and political institutions is needed to explain why
Dicey's and Hayek's intuitions about markets and government power, for example, are
correct. There are no shortcuts in the process. Too much weight therefore is placed upon
the rule of law to filter out good from bad legal rules.... The harder question therefore is
how does one choose among different types of legal orders, all of which satisfy the formal
requirements of the rule of law. The answer to that question again drives us beyond the rule
of law ....
Richard A. Epstein, Beyond the Rule of Law: Civic Virtue and Constitutional Structure, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 149, 154 (1987).
Discussing what constitutes good law is far less important to Walker than the continued
organic development of social values, a development that occurs under some conditions but not
under others. Concretizing more than the most fundamental structural rights necessary to this
spontaneous development of social values would ossify the legal structure against inevitable
change. Failure to concretize these fundamental rights would result in anarchy or tyranny, con-
ditions under which social values are warped or extinguished.
36. Hayek's claim that he is interested in transcultural "principles which claim universal
validity" is remarkable given the fact that the principles that he espouses are those of a modern,
market-driven, Western society. HAYEK, supra note 6, at 4. Walker attempts to steer clear of
Hayek's failing without explicitly acknowledging the need to do so.
37. In The Constitution of Liberty, Hayek entitles part I The Value of Freedom and sets out
first to establish the principle of individual freedom. Part II, Freedom and the Law, then follows
with a discussion of the Rule of Law as an instrument for securing this concept of freedom.
HAYEK, supra note 6.
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mitment to individual liberty from contemporary community values
by according it the status of a principle of natural justice. Critics then
are able to demonstrate that Hayek's position is indefensible. For
example, Allan Hutchinson and Patrick Monahan characterize
Hayek's theory as a "thick version" of the Rule of Law because it
supplements a discussion of bare procedural requirements of institu-
tionalized rule-following with an overriding theory of political justice
founded upon a conception of individual liberty.38 Hutchinson and
Monahan then provide a normative critique of Hayek's individualism
by arguing that participatory democracy rather than individual liberty
should be the regulative principle of social organization. In effect,
Hutchinson and Monahan indict Hayek's approach to the Rule of
Law as an ineffective means to an unattainable and illegitimate end. 9
Walker would argue that Hayek erred when he characterized West-
ern conceptions of individual freedom as essential and unchanging
principles of the Rule of Law. Notably absent from Walker's theory is
an explicit and passionate defense of individual liberty and the laissez-
faire economy. He even suggests that the Rule of Law can be realized
in communist, Islamic, and new age communitarian societies." In
contrast to Hayek, Walker envisions a more flexible concept of legal
freedom, one that rises above the political oscillations between com-
munitarian republicanism and laissez-faire individualism, thereby pro-
viding a framework in which a dynamic society can. break free from
current forms of social interaction without devolving to anarchy. In
response to the critique by Hutchinson and Monahan, Walker
undoubtedly would point out that their democratic vision ultimately
reintroduces familiar features of the Rule of Law to the extent that
these features are necessary to preserve democracy rather than to pre-
serve individual liberty.41 Walker would regard this as a distinction
without a difference. He argues that the Rule of Law will protect the
fabric of society in any transition to more radical democratic politics,
38. Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan, Democracy and the Ruj'e of Law, in THE RULE
OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 97, 101, 106 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds.,
1987). Clifford Geertz employs the term "thick description" in CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973).
39. Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 38, at 11. In their view, "the Rule of Law sustains
elitist politics" against the claims of democracy. Id.; see also Michael r. Sandel, The Political
Theory of the Procedural Republic, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY, supra note 38,
at 85-96.
40. See WALKER, supra note 12, at 12-14, 32-33, 208-12.
41. Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 38, at 122 (admitting the need to preserve free





and in fact the Rule of Law is indispensable if such a transition is to
occur.
Walker defines the Rule of Law as a political environment of con-
straining rules that nevertheless constantly are infused with contempo-
rary social values.42 Contemporary values do not form fixed and
timeless values that define the Rule of Law because they constantly are
in flux. Only principles of natural justice, stripped even of traditional
liberal individualism, remain as fixed elements within Walker's defini-
tion of the Rule of Law. Walker's definition attempts to negotiate an
uneasy alliance between a positivist, institutional approach and a val-
ues approach. Walker claims that the merit of his definition is that it
accords with post-Enlightenment thought. In part two, I demonstrate
that Walker's uneasy alliance is unsatisfactory, but first it is necessary
to relate Walker's description of the post-Enlightenment world view.
B. The New Physics and the Rule of Law
The intriguing character of Walker's book is not that he defends the
Rule of Law, but that he does so while acknowledging that society is
undergoing a profound transformation from the modem Enlighten-
ment period to a post-Enlightenment world view.43 Walker believes
that his definition of the Rule of Law captures this profound transfor-
mation, and so it is important to describe his characterization of the
challenge of post-Enlightenment thought. Walker contends that we
can best appreciate the importance of the Rule of Law for the emerg-
ing post-Enlightenment world by recalling past challenges to the doc-
trine. Walker emphasizes that the Rule of Law not only overcame the
ancien regime but also stood as a bulwark against the excesses of
Enlightenment political theory. Remembering and conserving the
Rule of Law heritage is an important preparatory step to defending
the doctrine as being consonant with post-Enlightenment thought.
Walker argues that the spirit of Enlightenment threatens to under-
mine the Rule of Law. Enlightenment thinkers equate the Rule of
Law with a static, tradition-bound system of rules that impedes the
reorganization of society along more just or rational lines.' On one
hand, extreme legal positivists claim that the "slow, tentative, unsys-
tematic and small-time" 45 procedure of the common law is inferior to
the use of command to remake society, and that legislatures are and
42. WALKER, supra note 12, at 8-42.
43. Id. at 54-92.
44. Id. at 52-54.
45. Id. at 375.
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should be unshackled from limits imposed on their power by irrational
tradition.4 6 On the other hand, extreme legal realists claim that judges
simply create positive law and are never really bound by principle, nor
should they be, and that their presumed separate role in a constitu-
tional system largely is a charade. 7 Walker views these contemporary
challenges as similar in kind to the earlier challenge to the developing
Rule of Law in seventeenth century England.48 Walker argues that
the battle between Francis Bacon, allied with the King's claim to royal
prerogative, and Sir Edward Coke, who championed the sovereignty
of the common law applied by judges, is being replayed in response to
modem thinkers embracing the tenets of Enlightenment.49 In the past
battle, Coke was able to preserve the common law and his successor,
Sir Matthew Hale, firmly ensconced the common law as the central
feature of English jurisprudence, thereby precluding the unconstrained
exercise of power by the sovereign.5" Walker's claim, simply put, is
that the Enlightenment quest to control social organization by chal-
lenging the Rule of Law was properly rebuffed three hundred years
ago, and similarly should be rebuffed today.
46. Id. at 140-61.
47. Id. at 172-99. Notably, "[t]he doctrine of legal realism, which was conceived only as an
explanation for aspects of the judicial process, has been twisted into serving as a guide to how
courts ought to go about their functions." Id. at 375.
48. Walker refers to this period as a "distant mirror," id at 104, perhaps an allusion to
Barbara Tuchman's investigation of the "calamitous fourteenth century" as a distant mirror
reflecting the social upheavals reverberating throughout the West in the latter half of the
twentieth century. BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, A DISTANT MIRROR: THE CALAMITOUS 14TH
CENTURY (1978). As Tuchman explains, "If our last decade or two of collapsing assumptions
has been a period of unusual discomfort, it is reassuring to know that the human species has lived
through worse before." Id at xiii. Similarly, Walker believes that the Rule of Law "seems to
gain its brightest lustre when it is under threat and there is a sense of danger surrounding its
prospects for survival." WALKER, supra note 12, at 127.
49. Walker writes:
Those times had much in common with our own....
Two paths to the future lay open. One, the "modem" model as it then appeared, was the
continental system of a sovereign king, backed by a standing army and a royal career
bureaucracy, to maintain order and foster economic development and the humane sciences.
The other was the parliamentary model, which drew its inspiration from the medieval past,
especially from the conception of the rule of law. This seemed to be the conservative, old-
fashioned side of the argument .... The prerogatives of the king of England had to be
increased, as the prerogatives of the continental kings had been, if England were to keep its
place among the civilized states of Europe, or so it seemed.
Then, as now, the vision of strong centralized power, of rational and expert
administration, of breaking with the traditions of an old governing class and making a new
start in a new era, exercised a powerful attraction for intellectuals [such as Bacon].
WALKER, supra note 12, at 104-05. The "modern model" described by Walker invoked a theory
of pure legal positivism as its underlying justification because the command of the rationalizing
sovereign would be unencumbered by values rooted in tradition. See supra note 21.
50. WALKER, supra note 12, at 107-14, 119-25.
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Walker asserts that current attacks on the Rule of Law do not
reflect new insight, but rather amount to the most recent expressions
of an essential tension between power and law.51 The modern corol-
laries to Francis Bacon are the members of an expanding social class
of the political-intellectual elite, whom Walker dubs the "clerisy. "52
The clerisy embraces the ideals of the Enlightenment. Experience and
tradition are ruthlessly rejected in favor of truths developed in critical
discourse where one may only appeal to the better argument and never
to the authority of tradition. Legislative programs to reshape society
have replaced Bacon's support for a strong monarchy to maintain
peace, but the glorification of the use of power is similar. Ostensibly,
there is concern for the individual as a participant in dialogue, but
Walker argues that the framework of the dialogue envisioned by the
clerisy is foreign to the Rule of Law. 53
51. Id. at 405.
52. Id. at 246-55. Walker's notion of the "clerisy" is not new nor particularly insightful.
Walker contends that a highly educated, relatively wealthy group of individuals plays
increasingly important roles in the technocratic world, and that these individuals view
themselves as proper managers for society. In an unintentionally humorous chapter, Walker
describes the critical legal studies (cls) movement, which he compares to Lenin's Bolshevik party,
id., as a vanguard for the clerisy that is "bringing about a cultural revolution that is shaking
every corner of our society." Id. at 284. Hardly. The cls merry pranksters can only dream of
being half as important and effective as agents for political change. At another point, Walker
contradicts himself by describing the cls movement as having had "little direct influence outside
the law schools." Id at 256. More importantly, Walker badly misreads the more interesting
(deconstructive) variants of cls that are committed to exposing and overcoming Enlightenment
ideology.
Nevertheless, Walker's point is well taken that the Faust legend is a principle archetype of
modernity for good reason: bold attempts to remake society through the alchemy of rationalism
are just as dangerous to society as the effort to avoid change by adhering to a dogmatic
traditionalism. Walker believes that modern critics of the Rule of Law are definitively answered
if legal theorists conserve the dynamic character of the doctrine, and once again refuse the
temptation to succumb to the Mephistophelian false promise of untrammeled power.
53. The new clerisy... is dedicated to removing the constitutional barriers to the exercise
of government power and to recasting all social relations into the currency of power, as
opposed to law or tradition or consent.... [I]t stands for the rejection of what it sees as
outmoded legal institutions and for the adoption of a view of law based on sovereign power
guided by reason and utility ....
Id. at 246. Morton Horwitz articulates what might be regarded by Walker as the clerisy credo:
I do not see how a Man of the Left can describe the rule of law as an "unqualified human
good"! It undoubtedly restrains power, but it also prevents power's benevolent exercise....
It may be true that restraint on power (and simultaneously on its benevolent exercise) is
about all that we can hope to accomplish in this world. But we should never forget that a
"legalist" consciousness that excludes "result-oriented" jurisprudence as contrary to the
rule of law also inevitably discourages the pursuit of substantive justice.
Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561, 566
(1977) (reviewing and criticizing E.P. Thompson's discussion of the Rule of Law as expressed in
E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HuNTERs: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT (1975)).
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To resist the elevation of rational power over traditional law,
Walker borrows the Taoist idea that polar opposites, as represented by
the interplay of Yin and Yang, are in fact dynamically related. Based
on this framework, he constructs a defense of the Rule of Law not as
an absolute, but as a balance or compromise.54 Social organization is a
dynamic equilibrium that balances the Yin of law (conservative,
responsive, and contractive) with the Yang of power (aggressive,
demanding, and expansive). "The rule of law doctrne is in essence a
set of operating instructions for maintaining that equilibrium."55
Social development requires an interplay of law and power, and
Walker vigorously defends the equilibrium achieved by the Rule of
Law.
In response to critics who wrongly characterize the Rule of Law as
a dogma that is unbalanced toward order, stability, and tradition,
Walker reaffirms flexibility as an integral part of the Rule of Law and
emphasizes that the substantive requirement that laws conform to pre-
vailing social values is a key feature of his definition for this very
reason.
5 6
The contemporary critics of the rule of law see it as one branch of a
dichotomy--on the one side, the rule of law, representing the status quo,
and on the other side, and in complete opposition, flexibility, change and
progress. J. A. G. Griffith, for example, maintains that the rule of law is
only a mask for the rule of "conventional, established and settled
interests."
This view is mistaken. Excessive rigidity, legalism and undue solici-
tude towards vested rights per se are as much of a threat to the rule of
law as arbitrariness, legal inconstancy and lack of regard for natural
justice. That is the reason for [requiring congruence with social values
to be part of the definition].5
54. WALKER, supra note 12, at 46-48.
55. Id. at 48.
56. Id. at 53-54. Walker states that "the true opposite of the rule of law is not change, but
anarchy and tyranny." Id. at 54.
57. Id. at 52-53. Walker emphasizes the flexibility of the Rule of Law doctrine in a way that
underscores the shift in thinking that he envisions.
There is no process of genuine social change so fundamental that the rule of law can not
accommodate and facilitate it. Indeed, to apply the checks inherent in the rule of law
without giving play to the principle of flexibility [i.e., the requirement of general congruence
of law with social values] is both to misunderstand the relationship between the rule of law
and change and to endanger the rule of law's survival. This much is made clear from the
history of the French parlements, which obstructed the necessary, and popular, legislative
reforms sought by the kings, thereby helping to ignite a conflagration that consumed




Walker does not equate the Rule of Law with slavish traditionalism
because he allows for innovation by requiring the law to embody
changing social values.
Walker equates critical legal studies (cls) with Enlightenment social
theory in the Marxist tradition. He stresses that cls scholars continue
to make the same tired attacks on the Rule of Law that overlook the
necessity of maintaining an equilibrium of stable law and assertive
power.
With their campaign against rule of law concepts, CLS and the clerisy
are engaged in removing the safeguards against tyranny and anarchy
that the lawyers of previous centuries built up with such effort and at
such cost. The very institutions that most allow for development and
free experimentation are being derided as closed and unresponsive.
... Here, as elsewhere, we neglect the theory of dynamic equilibrium
at our peril. If we want change, we must allow for a certain amount of
its opposite, stability. The rule of law can provide that. But if we pur-
sue change ruthlessly and single-mindedly, the newly rediscovered the-
ory tells us that the forces we unleash will swing back on themselves and
leave us with less constructive change and progress than was ever
thought possible.58
Walker asserts that the dynamic equilibrium afforded by the Rule of
Law is the bulwark of a progressive society, and that the cls call for a
revolutionary reorientation of society has a hollow ring. Walker seem-
ingly meets these critics on their own turf: law is politics, but rejecting
the Rule of Law is bad politics.5 9
Walker recognizes that because the Enlightenment era is drawing to
an end it is not enough to recall that the Rule of Law countered the
Enlightenment glorification of the exercise of rational power. He
believes that it is also important for theorists to demonstrate the
"affirmative" value of the Rule of Law for the post-Enlightenment era
that we are now entering.' Just as the paradigm of objective scien-
tific inquiry in the natural sciences epitomized and fueled the Enlight-
enment world view, the tumultuous changes in our conception of
science are defining the post-Enlightenment world view. The shift
from the Newtonian/Cartesian paradigm of nature as a machine
58. Id. at 284-85, 287.
59. Cf Jeffrey M. Blum, Critical Legal Studies and the Rule of Law, 38 BuFF. L. REV. 59, 59
n.* (1990) (arguing from the left that critics "are contributing to a growing academic
sophistication about legal principles while diverting radicals from developing effective forms of
political rhetoric, many of which will at least implicitly rely on the idea of Rule of Law").
60. WALKER, supra note 12, at 54-92 ("The Affirmative Aspect: Law and Pardigm Change").
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transparent to the human mind is giving way to a post-Einsteinian
physics that views reality as an undifferentiated whole in which we are
situated as participants rather than as observers.
Walker argues that this shift in scientific thought holds important
implications for legal theory and practice.
[I]f society is seen as an organism, any part of which can be impaired by
an action on any of the others, a different picture takes shape. Govern-
ment and parliament are no longer in the role of a mechanic, indeed
they are no longer entitled to see themselves as separate from society at
all.... The new world view sees social groupings as wholes and sys-
tems; but by admitting that the complex, non-linear, not-a-priori-pre-
dictable interactions of each individual component will affect the result,
it gives a new importance and dignity to the individual. 61
The connections between an emerging scientific paradigm and devel-
oping notions of a proper legal system were an understandable feature
of seventeenth century England where many intellectuals were profi-
cient in both natural sciences and legal theory. Today it is more diffi-
cult for the lawyer or legal scholar to appreciate a:ad assimilate the
emerging scientific paradigm, but Walker regards the task as vital.62
61. Id. at 56.
62. Id. at 70-71. In fact, there is significant recent interest in this area. See, eg., Laurence H.
Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Lean: from Modern Physics,
103 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1989) (outlining the basic implications of relativity theory [space is not a
neutral backdrop, but an actor] and quantum theory [by observing the physical world, it is
altered) for developing a constitutional discourse that better explains our social world); Joan C.
Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rh'e of the New Langdells,
62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (1987) (arguing that critical legal studies scholars have failed to grasp
the broad implications of the "new epistemology," which is strongly influenced by quantum
theory); R. George Wright, Should the Law Reflect the World?: Lessons for Legal Theory from
Quantum Mechanics, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 855 (1991) (discussing how contemporary schools
of legal theory might benefit from the "inherent indeterminacy" model of quantum theory).
I am mindful of Mark Tushnet's caution that lawyers have an unfortunate tendency to believe
themselves capable of understanding these complex and highly specialized issues in other
disciplines. Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public
Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REv. 1307, 1338 n.140 (1979) (criticizing the
"lawyer as astrophysicist" assumption). However, without defending Walker's intentions, it
should be clear that my references to developments in quantum philosophy are not intended to
use the natural sciences to validate my argument, and that I regard any such effort of validation
as misguided. See infra note 116 and accompanying text. It is not necessary to be trained in
quantum physics to appreciate how the debates in quantum philosophy touch on issues relevant
to jurisprudential inquiry. I would not want to encourage a division of labor between legal
practice and philosophy any more than I would urge a separation of physics and philosophy. But
cf Mark Tushnet, The Left Critique of Normativity: A Comment, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 2325, 2347
n.94 (1992) (commenting on Andrew Altman's suggestion that a diision of labor emerge
whereby law professors engage in small-scale reform while philosophers develop leftist theory).
One need only consider the works of Karl Llewellyn and Michael Polanyi, which demonstrate
that philosophy, often viewed as sterile and quite uninteresting if not practiced within a specific
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The changing scientific paradigm is mirrored in changes occurring in
other disciplines, and the legal system will be altered no less by the
new world view.
Walker briefly summarizes some of the developments in theory over
the last fifty years that serve as signposts for the emerging world
view.63 Walker does not pretend to have comprehensive knowledge of
these (often extremely controversial) developments in other fields;
instead, he uses these examples to make a simple point. Our concep-
tion of the way that we perceive, understand, and live is undergoing a
transformation that Walker believes will have a significant impact on
how we understand law. Lawmakers no longer will view society as a
machine to be modified and maintained through the exercise of power,
but rather as a dynamic and interrelated system that cannot be subju-
gated to the understanding or will of a ruling elite. Walker contends
that we will come to regard the Enlightenment view that a law is an
object standing on its own to be as wrongheaded as the Enlightenment
view that physical matter is an object that stands on its own apart
from the scientific investigator. Walker optimistically predicts that
discipline, benefits from the contextual perspectives of lawyers and scientists. See, eg., KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1962); POLANYI, supra
note 9. Certainly one of Gadamer's themes (and a theme of postmodernism generally) is that
philosophy as a separate meta-discipline is all but dead. This is why Gadamer emphasizes the
experience of art and the exemplary significance of legal practice in developing his philosophical
hermeneutics. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 10, at 101-69, 324-41.
63. Walker uses Pitirim Sorokin's theory of social dynamics as the overriding metaphor of the
social changes underway, WALKER, supra note 12, at 58-63, but Walker also looks to Jung's
acausal notion of synchronicity, the impact of quantum theory, general systems theory,
parapsychology, and the use of the structure of holograms as a metaphor of both mind and
matter. Id. at 64-76. The connecting theme of these disparate developments is that reality is not
simply a collection of discrete things and events, but instead is a holistic relationship.
For example, Jung's theory of synchronicity rejects a solely causal and mechanistic approach
to the world and accepts that there can be a "coincidence in time of two or more causally
unrelated events which have the same or similar meaning," id. at 71, and that this principle of
coincidence manifests a universal principle in nature. Id. at 71-72. In fact, Jung's alleged
"mysticism" has affinities with the conclusions drawn from the principle of nonlocality, which
radical quantum philosophers take to be a fundamental aspect of reality. BOHM, supra note 9, at
186-89; Kevin J. Sharpe, Relating the Physics and Religion of David Bohm, 25 ZYGON 105,
106-07 (1990).
Similarly, the work being done based on the structure of holograms points toward a holistic
view. A hologram is constructed by laser light to produce a three dimensional image. The
interesting feature of this resulting "picture" is that even a portion of the picture, when magnified
to the original size of the picture, reveals the whole image (albeit with some distortion) rather
than just a portion of the image. Walker notes that the hologram is a powerful symbol that leads
some philosophers and scientists to conclude that the picture of nature is not simply composed of
discrete, self-contained building blocks. WALKER, supra note 12, at 74-76. A more radical
account is that the hologram is not simply a symbol, but rather exemplifies the structure of the
universe in which various presumed discrete "parts" actually are explicit abstractions from the
implicit wholeness of the universe. See generally BOHM, supra note 9, at 143-50.
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future generations of lawyers raised in the new paradigm "will refash-
ion our law so thoroughly that in the future our present legal order
will look as chaotic, unenlightened and brutal as the old mediaeval law
seems to us today."'  But Walker also cautions that this wonderful
new age is not inevitable. Walker's defense of the Rule of Law primar-
ily is motivated by his assessment that the Rule of Law will be an
essential political feature of any society that is able t:o follow through
on the vague intimations of the new age that the world is now exper-
iencing.65 Walker's thesis of the coming age comes off sounding like a
strange admixture of Friedrich Hayek and Shirley MacLaine, but his
attentiveness to the need to rethink the Rule of Law from a post-
Enlightenment perspective properly directs his inquLry.
Walker argues that commitment to the Rule of Law is desirable
during this time of transition for several reasons. First, as with all
social transformations, there will be a rough and uneven period as the
old views slowly expire and new views become the dominant feature of
the social world; in this turbulent period the Rule of Law can prevent
anarchy.66 Second, the transition cannot be mapped out in advance,
and will consist of various experiments in social interaction. The Rule
of Law protects the pluralism necessary for society to stumble along
its way to a post-Enlightenment world, the beginnings of which
Walker sees in the communitarian movement's effort to build ecologi-
cally sound and peaceful "new age communities."67 After all, Walker
notes, it is important to remember that there are "no new-age commu-
64. WALKER, supra note 12, at 86-87.
65. Walker argues that we need the Rule of Law
as a framework for the period of experimentation and transition on which we are embarked,
to facilitate the working out of new values and approaches and to prevent friction and
violence between different groups taking different ways. Without it we may not succeed in
making the conversion to a new value system.
Id. at 234. In addition, Walker asserts that
[w]ithout the rule of law the necessary transformation will be unnecessarily painful, so pain-
ful that it may not be accomplished at all. On the other hand, withoLt the transformation,
the rule of law itself will not survive in the longer term. The two need each other.
Id. at 379.
66. Im at 56, 91-92. "Outbreaks of lawlessness or coercion at such a time would so increase
the dislocation and hardships associated with change that the disruptive stress could prove too
much. Society could fall to make the transition at all." Id. at 92.
67. Id. at 211-12, 405-06. Walker defines the new age themes to include:
voluntary simplicity lifestyles, networking as opposed to hierarchy in organizations,
meditation and transcendental conciousness, self-improvement techniques through the
tapping of the 'inner source', decentralization as opposed to centralization, soft technology,
holistic health and healing, parapsychology and innumerable others. Though these other
strands may in some cases be less scientific, and in parts may be cultish, facile or fraudulent,
they are in their own ways evidence of a new perspective on reality.




nities in the Soviet Union or China.""8 Finally, and most importantly,
the Rule of Law as a doctrine of balance between law and power has a
strong affinity with the post-Enlightenment themes of the developing
world view and therefore is well-suited to serve as a guiding princi-
ple.69 The Rule of Law, then, stands not only as a tradition that
properly survived the rationalizing forces of the Enlightenment and
must be conserved as a political necessity for the impending social
transformation,70 but also as a doctrine that complements the emerg-
ing world view of society as a holistic system.
C. The Political Challenge to the Rule of Law
Walker insists that modem politics directly challenges the contin-
ued viability of the Rule of Law because modem politics continues to
be defined by Enlightenment ideology. Today, Walker contends, the
For such a pattern of experimentation, innovation and mutual toleration to exist, certain
conditions must prevail. People must be free to follow their own paths without being
coerced by others; the law must be reasonably stable and predictable so that people can plan
their ventures and their explorations of new values; the same legal rules must apply equally
to all, otherwise a sense of injustice, entailing threats to the peace, will arise between differ-
ent groups; government leaders will need to refrain from seeking arbitrarily to impose their
own solutions on all. In short, the rule of law is the best environment for such a time of
innovation and discovery. A renewed appreciation of the rule of law will enable our legal
system, and perhaps our whole society to adapt more smoothly and successfully to some
profound cultural changes that appear to be under way.
Id. at 57.
68. Id. at 91. In the years since 1988 when Walker's book was published, the prospects for
new age communities in some of the republics formerly constituting the Soviet Union would
seem to have greatly improved, presumably due to the introduction of the Rule of Law.
69. On the other hand, critics of the Rule of Law glorify power over law, and are seen as the
last gasps of the old order.
[A]ll the attacks made on the rule of law have as their philosophic basis the same narrow,
late sensate, mechanistic thinking. Both the right-wing activists who urge that civil liberties
be abridged pursuant to the 'war against crime', and left-wing critics from the Critical Legal
Studies movement who regard the rule of law as an archaic obstacle to the forcible
reconstruction of society, are viewing law through the identical constricted windows of the
sensate mind. Although the latter group see their position as 'progressive', it is in fact only a
manifestation of the decomposing sensate order in its most extreme form. So far from being
the burgeoning greenwood of the new age, it is merely a florid fungus on the rotting trunk of
the old.
It at 88-89.
70. Walker's pragmatic insistence on Rule of Law values for the turbulent period that society
now faces mirrors the political battles fought by Coke. Cf Don Herzog, As Many as Six
Impossible Things Before Breakfast, 75 CAL. L. Rnv. 609, 624-27 (1987) (arguing that Coke was
no detached theorist but rather a shrewd politician who used liberal principles to improve and
sustain social reforms). For a different view of Coke's impact, see Hutchinson & Monahan,
supra note 38, at 100-03 (contending that Coke was part of a historical progression in which the
Rule of Law "occasionally proved to be an effective principle to check the indulgent abuse of
power by the few over the many," but that the attention to the Rule of Law ultimately displaced
the more important movement toward a democratic society).
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Rule of Law is undermined in two principal ways. First, legislation no
longer provides general and universally applicable guides for behavior;
instead, special interest groups vie for protective legislation in an era
of universal legislative plunder.71 Second, adjudication no longer pre-
serves the Rule of Law because judges either relinquish unlimited sov-
ereignty to the legislature, or, when they do act, they openly render ad
hoc judgments in response to the equities surrounding the litigants at
bar rather than applying the law to the case before them.72 Walker
contends that these broad-based political failings stem from two
related trends that contradict the Rule of Law: the acceptance of posi-
tive law (legislation and administrative command) as sovereign and
unbounded, and the disabling of the judiciary's ability to serve as a
check on the sovereignty of positive law.73 In the former case, legisla-
tion becomes the tool for economic and social engineering by those
groups with access to power. In the latter case, adjudication either
ignores or exacerbates the problems created by the modem,
bureaucratized state.
The cornerstone of positivism is that the commands of a legitimate
sovereign must be recognized as law. Walker traces the history of pos-
itivism to its roots in the transition to the Enlightenment era.74 The
Rule of Law first weathered the claim by Tudor monarchs that a
divine right to exercise unfettered power was necessary to put an end
to the private violence that threatened the social fabric of sixteenth
century England. 75 Later, the doctrine was endangered by the emerg-
ing view that an omnipotent parliament was the only sufficient coun-
terbalance to the threat posed by the residual power of the monarch.76
Although this view never succeeded in suppressing the Rule of Law,
with the advent of modem positivism it has again resurfaced with
greater vitality. A. V. Dicey is widely recognized as having pro-
71. See WALKER, supra note 12, ch. 8, at 235-45 ("The Legislative Explosion"), ch. 11, at
288-3 10 ("Immediate Consequences of the Legislative Explosion").
72. See id. ch. 6, at 162-99 ("Dangerous Distortions in Adjudication").
73. This focus is instructive. Although Walker believes that it is fundamentally important for
laws to track social values, unlimited majoritarian democracy is perceived as a significant threat
to the Rule of Law.
A substantial congruence between government objectives and popular attitudes, by
whatever means achieved, therefore seems to be a prerequisite. At the same time, it does not
follow that the rule of law is in force merely because a majority of the people supports a
government's actions and outlook. A lynch mob is an example of pure, popular democracy
of the most direct kind, but it is the antithesis of the rule of law.
Id. at 14.
74. See supra note 21.
75. WALKER, supra note 12, at 97-102.




pounded the classic statement of the traditional understanding of the
Rule of Law," but Walker emphasizes that Dicey's status as a modem
positivist raises a paradox.7 If the Rule of Law forecloses arbitrary or
selective assertions of government authority, it appears impossible to
reconcile the Rule of Law with the positivist view that even arbitrary
and selective legislation must be considered law. The paradox of
Dicey's jurisprudence, for Walker, is symptomatic of the attitude lead-
ing to the contemporary situation where the Rule of Law is reduced to
an empty formulation at best, or regarded as an obstacle to legislative
reform at worst.
Walker resolves Dicey's paradox by relying on the tradition of sepa-
ration of powers.79 Legislation is never self-executing, but must
always be applied (interpreted) by administration officials and, in the
case of a conflict, by judges.80 As a positivist, Dicey acknowledged
only pragmatic constraints on the legislature," but Walker argues that
the latitude to innovate afforded the legislature under the positivist
perspective is incompatible with the Rule of Law. Walker believes
that adjudication provides the answer to the paradox of legislative sov-
ereignty because judges constrain the effects of legislation by interpret-
ing it. But Walker's solution affords him no comfort, as he argues that
positivism has been coupled with the dismantling of the judiciary's
ability to serve its vital function. 2
77. A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONsTrrTUION
202-03 (10th ed. 1959). As described by Walker, Dicey's definition comprised three
requirements:
(1) the absolute supremacy of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power; a
man might be punished for a breach of law, but could be punished for nothing else; (2)
equality before the law of all persons and classes, including government and government
officials; (3) the full incorporation of constitutional law as part of the ordinary law of the
land, not as a separate constitutional code which might be vulnerable to suspension in times
of trouble.
WALKER, supra note 12, at 20.
78. See WALKER, supra note 12, ch. 4, at 128-39 ("The Dicey Paradox").
79. T.R.S. Allan favorably compares Dicey's alleged dogmatic positivism with Ronald
Dworkin's continuing development of a jurisprudence that recognizes a principled basis for law.
In contrast to Walker, Allan argues that Dicey did appreciate the importance of judicial review
as a limitation on legislative authority. T.R.S. Allan, Dworkin and Dicey: The Rule of Law as
Integrity, 8 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 266, 269 (1988) ("Powers, however extraordinary, which
are conferred or sanctioned by statute, are never really unlimited, for they are confined by the
words of the Act itself, and, what is more, by the interpretation put upon the statute by the
judges." (quoting DICEY, supra note 77, at 413)).
80. WALKER, supra note 12, at 130-40.
81. Dicey contended that members of Parliament by nature are not outrageous people who
would abuse their position, and noted further that outrageous laws simply would not be obeyed.
Id. at 146.
82. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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Walker believes that since courts are the ultimate arbiter of what
the law is, they have less discretion than the legislature.8 3 Indeed, this
premise necessarily follows from the fact that the purpose of courts in
a constitutional structure is to counterbalance the legislature's other-
wise institutionally unlimited discretion. In response to the realist/cls
assertion that courts do not fulfill the "limited discretion" role they
are assigned to play, Walker's admitted challenge is to justify a belief
that judges can be independent but not too independent, thereby strik-
ing the balance of law and power that is essential to his view of the
Rule of Law. 4 Walker identifies two obstacles to the judiciary realiz-
ing their crucial role in practice. First, judges may refuse to assert
their role as a check on attempts to establish complete legislative
supremacy. Walker terms this the problem of abdication. 5 Second,
judges may refuse to adhere to the law in an attempt to accept for
themselves the mantel of legislative supremacy. Walker terms this the
problem of judicial usurpation of the executive and legislative
functions. 86
Judicial abdication occurs more frequently in England, which oper-
ates without a formal written constitution. Walker argues that a key
feature of the English common law is the practice that courts will
interpret Acts of Parliament to be consistent with the principles of the
common law, and will overturn those Acts that cannot be interpreted
as consistent.8 7 Walker heralds the early assertion by English courts
of a wide latitude to interpret statutes. 88 However, in the twentieth
century the spirit of Enlightenment and the jurisprudence of legal pos-
itivism reached their full effect, leading to an abdication of power by
jurists in England and in other Commonwealth countries that is only
83. WALKER, supra note 12, at 131.
84. Id. at 42.
85. See id. at 177-81.
86. See id. at 181-94.
87. Id. at 153-54. Even with written federal and state constitutions, American jurisdictions
generally still pay lip service to the interpretative maxim that statutes in derogation of the
common law must be construed strictly by the courts. SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 50.01 (4th
ed. 1984) ("Absent an indication that the legislature intends a statute to supplant common law,
the courts should not give it that effect."); id. § 58.03 (noting that modern courts tend to view the
maxim as a "judicially fabricated obstaclel] to progress through legislation"); id. §§ 61.01-.06
(detailing the maxim and the criticisms lodged against it, but concluding that, in spite of
criticisms, "the rule has remarkable staying power in the judicial process").
88. Walker sees the culmination of this practice in the 1609 decision in Dr. Bonham's Case, in
which Chief Justice Coke wrote, "the common law will ... controul Acts of Parliament, and
sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common
right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it,




now beginning to abate.89 Walker draws a parallel between the Eng-
lish experience and the current solicitous attitude displayed by Ameri-
can courts toward administrative agencies. 9°
Walker believes that the American experience most clearly demon-
strates the threat of judicial usurpation. The American political tradi-
tion is defined by a written constitution, and the early and firmly
89. Walker identifies the period of 1920 to 1960 as the nadir of judicial review in the
Commonwealth countries. WALKER, supra note 12, at 177-81. This period ended with the rise
of a new administrative law, and particularly the judicial rejection of ouster clauses. Id. at
155-56. For a negative account of this new judicial attitude, see HUTCHINSON, supra note 4, at
85-124.
90. WALKER, supra note 12, at 180-81. During the last several decades, the abdication of
judicial supervision of regulatory affairs in America came to be one of the primary topics in Rule
of Law literature. See ALTMAN, supra note 6, at 51-56; HAYEK, supra note 6, at 193-204; Frank
E. Cooper, The Executive Department of Government and the Rule of Law, 59 MICH. L. REv.
515 (1961). The adoption of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) in 1946 was intended to
preserve judicial review of administrative agencies, but it hardly rectified the problem of
inadequate judicial review in the classical understanding. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452,
472-74 (1989). Farina argues that the APA was a direct response to the claim that modern
administrative agencies were not subject to the Rule of Law under judicial review and notes that
Congress subsequently has expressed interest in strengthening the judicial review provisions.
However, the APA simply did not address the deeper problem: the abdication of legality by a
legislative branch incapable of directly governing modern bureaucratic society. See also
Theodore J. Lowi, The Welfare State, the New Regulation and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF
LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY, supra note 38, at 17 (extending his earlier thesis in THE END OF
LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979) to encompass the "new regulation" of the 1970s which threatens to
displace entirely adherence to the Rule of Law ideal in favor of administrative discretion). In
this context, administrative agencies assume new importance as the bodies that interpret and
enforce a great deal of legislation. For recent commentary, see generally Farina, supra; Edward
L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. Rav. 369 (1989).
The Supreme Court has determined that in this legislative vacuum it is appropriate for courts
to defer to expert policy decisions made by agencies that are charged with implementing the
policy objectives of the executive branch. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984). This position has drawn support from
commentators. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review of
Agency Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43
ADMIN. L. REv. 7 (1991) (contending that systematic agency policymaking is stunted and
deflected by judicial review because the numerous federal judges are then able to substitute their
own policy beliefs for those of the agency under the indeterminate "adequate consideration"
doctrine); see also HUTCHINSON, supra note 4, at 102-14. Other commentators view Chevron as
an abdication of legitimate and desirable power by the courts. E.g., Sanford N. Caust-
Ellenbogen, Blank Checks. Restoring the Balance of Powers in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L.
REv. 757, 759 (1991) ("Chevron represents a usurpation ofjudicial power and results in excessive
concentration of power in administrative agencies." Instead, courts should defer to agencies on
the basis of a prudential case-by-case examination determined by the court ); cf. Maureen B.
Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations of Statutes?: A New Doctrinal
Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1275
(viewing Chevron as a self-imposed prudential limitation that allows continued flexibility in
adjudication).
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established tradition of judicial review after Marbuty v. Madison 9' has
emboldened judges not to defer to the doctrine of legislative superior-
ity.92 Far from relinquishing their roles, American judges have
enlarged the scope of their authority to the point that Walker ques-
tions whether there is any limit on the extravagant judicial innovation
of American courts during the past several decades.93 Walker traces
judicial usurpation to the legal realism movement that particularly
caught hold in America. 94 He admits that legal realism might have
been a correct description of judicial practice but that it has been mis-
used as a prescription for judicial activism, particularly by the later cls
realists.95 The fact that the emperor-judge is naked apparently is to be
ignored, most especially by the exposed judge who, after all, will find it
hard to do her job correctly if she is self-consciously bare of any legiti-
macy.96 As a solution to this problem of judicial tyranny, Walker
91. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
92. See WALKER, supra note 12, at 182-85 (citing Roe v. Wade, 41') U.S. 113 (1973), as an
example of decision making not grounded in law); see also John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf." A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 947 (1973) (a-guing that Roe is "bad
because it is bad constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law and gives almost
no sense of an obligation to try to be"). One commentator argues that American judicial method
developed to reflect a legislative concern with controlling future cases rather than a more
traditional (English) judicial concern with fidelity to precedent, 2aid that contemporary
American judicial method is moving toward a focus on the issues raised by the case at hand
rather than concerns with either the past or the future. James H. Hardisty, The Effect of Future
Orientation on the American Reformation of English Judicial Method, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 523
(1979). Professor Hardisty's description is similar to Walker's description of the demise of the
Rule of Law: "[T]here appears to have been a recent American trend toward present orientation,
and this has been reflected in the movement of the legal system away from rules." Id. at 543.
93. WALKER, supra note 12, at 182.
94. Id. (arguing "[w]ell-intentioned judicial realism [in America] has come close to what
some observers see as judicial tyranny"). Walker closely follows Lon Fuller's efforts to steer a
pragmatic course that avoids both positivism and radical realism by stressing the internal
morality of Law. Id. at 364-65. For recent histories of the American 'egal realism movement,
see GARY J. AICHELE, LEGAL REALISM AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE: THE CHANGING CONSENSUS (1983); JAMES E. HERGET, AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE, 1870-1970: A HISTORY 147-93 (1990); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM
AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT (1973).
In a famous article, Karl Llewellyn, a prominent though by nc means radical realist,
attempted to characterize the loosely organized movement known as legal realism. Karl N.
Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1222
(1931). For Fuller's assessment of Llewellyn's realism, see L. L. Fuller, American Legal
Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 429 (1934).
95. WALKER, supra note 12, at 172-77, 256-59.
96. Cf Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REv. 296 (1990) (arguing that judges
should always be candid [that is, never consciously duplicitous], but that introspection on the act
of judging would be counterproductive because it would tend to make the law less constraining




urges judges to revitalize and hearken back to a "classical theory" of
the judicial role. As was clear from his definition of the Rule of Law,
in the final analysis, Walker contends that adjudicative practice girds
the realization of the Rule of Law.
Walker describes the classical tradition of the common law, which
regarded the judge as a participant in a long history of decision mak-
ing. Classical judges carefully preserved yet also extended the custom-
ary law of the people by cultivating a tradition that was anterior to the
aims and desires of both the parties and the judge.97 "It is because
common law rules are not the conscious invention of the judge that the
judge's role is accepted in society." 98 Judges undoubtedly bring a cer-
tain expertise and technical knowledge to bear on the social values
that form the basis of the common law, but this filtering process can
never altogether ignore the essential relationship of adjudication and
preexisting social values if the Rule of Law is to survive.99 The core
concept at work under this view is the realization and protection of
reasonable expectations. Parties expect that when disputes arise the
courts will do substantial justice in accordance with their expectations,
based upon the social context in which the dispute occurs. The situa-
tion is not very different when one moves from private law to public
law. The parties view the judge who applies a statute as a mediator
between the power of government and the impotence of citizens. "The
court's role as intermediary and the process whereby it becomes in
effect a breakwater protecting the public from the legislature, is for-
mally rationalized as being a search for the 'true intention of parlia-
ment' that is made necessary by the inherent ambiguity of
language."'10 In both situations the judge stands as an independent
check on the abuse of power in contravention of the scheme of social
values. In the private law context, it is a fellow citizen who threatens
to abuse the petitioning party; in the public law context, it is the gov-
ernment that transgresses the normative boundaries.
Walker contends that this classical style of adjudication accords
with the emerging post-Enlightenment world view because it promotes
a practice that is humble and patient.101 The dynamic balance of
power and law that Walker regards as the essence of the Rule of Law
is realized in the classical case-by-case practice of the common law.
He argues that this practice does not presume to break critically from
97. WALKER, supra note 12, at 162-72.
98. Id. at 163.
99. Id. at 166.
100. Id. at 172.
101. Id. at 194.
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tradition and to rationalize legal relations. Adjudication should never
aspire to articulate an abstract theory of just governance, but should
instead be concerned with the practical question at bar in a manner
that draws upon an embryonic tradition that is constantly being
renewed in the context of contemporary social values. At bottom,
Walker regards good judging as an essential practice if the Rule of
Law is to survive.
II. OVERCOMING THE METAPHYSICS OF
ENLIGHTENMENT
Post-Enlightenment thought challenges the possibility of the Rule
of Law. Dean Walker confronts this challenge by arguing that the
Rule of Law is not only possible in a post-Enlightenment world, it is a
political necessity. In this part of the Article, I first critique Walker's
position because it remains predicated on Enlightemment metaphysics
despite his efforts to the contrary. I then undertake to describe a her-
meneutical approach that better incorporates the challenge of post-
Enlightenment thought without abandoning the possibility of the Rule
of Law.
A. Critiquing Walker's Enlightenment Metaphysics
My detailed discussion of Walker's book will serve as the basis for
outlining a post-Enlightenment jurisprudence of the Rule of Law.
Although Walker correctly sees that the Rule of Law must be rear-
ticulated for the post-Enlightenment world, his vision is too limited.
Walker remains firmly within the methodological premises of the
Enlightenment, as is evident in the manner in which he constructs his
definition of the Rule of Law. Walker first defines the state of affairs
that constitutes the Rule of Law and then assesses current practice by
comparing it to this definition. Walker's inability to sustain the Rule
of Law flows from this initial mistaken perspective. The Rule of Law
is not an abstract, timeless, and independent political ideal against
which we can measure our legal practice. Instead, the doctrine of the
Rule of Law designates certain features of legal practice that must be
carefully and critically nurtured. Walker's methodology largely is
conceived in the Enlightenment spirit of objectively discerning the
foundations of social organization, even though he tempers his
approach with a post-Enlightenment concern about the social context
of the practices in question.
Walker's solution to the problem of realizing the Rule of Law in




tion. His proposed specific institutional reforms are subsidiary to the
preeminent goal of reestablishing an independent judiciary that never-
theless is constrained by the Rule of Law."2 Adjudication
counterbalances the concentration of unlimited discretion within the
legislative, executive, and law enforcement organs of government, and
also provides the link between law and current social values. The
common law court, both judge and jury, is the embodiment of the
dynamic balance of the Rule of Law, curbing the power of government
in accordance with law, but also incrementally changing the law in
response to a developing society.
In Walker's view, the Rule of Law requires that decision makers are
constrained by law but still are able to recognize and incorporate
socially evolving notions of law. This tension in Walker's definitional
structure confirms Judith Shklar's thesis that much of the modem
confusion surrounding the Rule of Law stems from the fact that
there are two quite distinct archetypes of the Rule of Law and that these
have become blurred by now and reduced to incoherence because the
political purposes and settings that gave them their significance have
been forgotten.... The upshot is that the Rule of Law is now situated,
intellectually, in a political vacuum. 103
Shklar identifies one archetype as derivative of Aristotle's idea of the
Rule of Law as the rule of reason by one constantly disposed to act
fairly and justly, which she regards as now being embodied principally
in Ronald Dworkin's emphasis on the rationality of judging." The
other archetype derives from liberalism's later emphasis on the Rule of
Law as a restraint against rulers, exemplified by Montesquieu's project
to preserve freedom in the face of threats by violent kings and arbi-
trary legislatures. This second archetype is the principal battleground
for the modem debates about the desirability of a liberal political
order. 105 The distinction between the two models is manifest not only
in the nature of the constraint on power (substantive vs. procedural),
but also in the purpose to which legitimate power is directed. Under
the ancient model, the Rule of Law was seen as a means of inculcating
all citizens with virtue, whereas the modem model views the Rule of
102. Id. at 387-99 (discussing his proposals for executive, legislative, and judicial reform).
103. Judith N. Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAw: IDEAL
OR IDEOLOGY, supra note 38, at 1; cf ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN
MORAL THEORY 51-61 (2d ed. 1984) (arguing that ethical theory has been rendered incoherent
in similar fashion).
104. Shklar, supra note 103, at 12-16.
105. Id. at 7-12 (citing as an example Hayek's defense of the free market versus Roberto
Unger's critique of this never-to-be-realized ideal).
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Law as a means of demarcating a wide sphere of individual freedom,
enabling citizens to pursue their own conception of a virtuous life."°6
As the noted political philosopher, Fred Dalmayr, notes, the con-
frontation of these two conflicting archetypes ends in aporia, threaten-
ing the very idea of the Rule of Law unless we approach the problem
from a new perspective. 07 These two archetypes are linked in histori-
cal progression. The ancient model of law, with its material (substan-
tive) element, was eclipsed by positivist interpretations. In its extreme
manifestations, the legal positivism of the Enlightenment period
attempted to divorce material law from the positive essence of the rule
set out in a given legal text:
By solidifying into a doctrine [in the Enlightenment period], rule-gov-
ernance or the rule of law... underwent a subtle change: namely, in the
direction of a steady formalization and legalization .... In earlier for-
mulations, law and lawfulness were still closely linked with notions of
the common good and thereby with broader substantive concerns. 108
The pure positivist vision of legal dogmatics proved to be a mirage.
In order to be applied in a given situation, all positive rules must first
be interpreted. However, it was not long before theorists acknowl-
edged that "issues of interpretation cannot rigorously be exiled or seg-
regated from normative rule-governance; in fact, the more normativity
is formalized and elevated above contingencies, the more its content
appears in need of interpretive retrieval and assessment."" 9 But if
contemporary commentators are unable to sustain the positivist pro-
ject, neither are they able to resuscitate the ancient substantive model.
Contemporary theory is an amalgam of the residues of these two
archetypes, both of which are no longer persuasive in their own right.
Walker attempts to reconcile the conflicting archetypes instead of
recasting the problem, but his mediative tightrope performance is
unsatisfactory. Walker argues that a central featu:re of the Rule of
Law is constraint, both of private coercion and governmental coer-
cion.110 Constraint is problematic for Walker, however, because he
envisions constraint on several different levels. Constraint first
depends on the ability to derive meaning from legal texts that are fash-
ioned to be generally applicable, prospectively enforced, and clearly
understood. However, as an overriding substantive matter, constraint
106. ALTMAN, supra note 6, at 68-69.
107. Dallmayr, supra note 6, at 1464-69.
108. Id. at 1456; see also ALTMAN, supra note 6, at 20-27 (contrasting the "generic liberal"
(thoroughly positivist) model of the Rule of Law with Plato's and Aristotle's models).
109. Dallmayr, supra note 6, at 1461.




also requires that the laws of society cannot significantly diverge from
social values, which order society in a more fundamental way than the
laws. Walker relies on a complex dynamic: guiding principles of social
organization must be concretized in practice, and yet legal texts must
stand as distinct repositories of stable and knowable rules. Requiring
that laws keep pace with the dynamic evolution of social values
demands that the law remain malleable, but this seems impossible in
the face of the traditional understanding of constraint as adherence to
a separate and objective legal rule. Aporia appears inevitable.
Despite his promise of a more productive path of inquiry drawing
on the lessons of post-Enlightenment science, and in particular on the
new physics, Walker's effort illustrates the intellectual cul de sac in
which contemporary jurisprudence finds itself. Walker wants it both
ways: the judge is a government clerk collating and applying the rules
but also is Hercules infusing the written code with the democratically
developed law of socially defined reasonable expectations. Needless to
say, Walker's approach sounds disappointingly familiar. During this
century, the judicial role has been critically examined and challenged.
Some theorists conclude that judges simply are not constrained to the
degree that Walker and other scholars believe they must be in order to
sustain the Rule of Law because the act of interpretation is a creative
and indeterminate practice that cannot be corralled by rules or institu-
tional constraints. By focusing on judicial review, Walker subjects
himself to the now time-worn question: How can the judge rationally
determine what the law is when the legal tradition is incoherent and
contradictory, and when judicial decisions are a matter of political
commitment rather than rational deduction? Walker's anaemic call
for judges to adopt the classical style of adjudication leads nowhere if
there are no legal principles to be discerned from precedent, independ-
ent of the decision maker's biases. Walker's view of the common law
is predicated on a belief that language is perspicuous, that the tradition
of the common law is a distinct statement of principles and policies
that are available to the judge like so many tools (perhaps not so
neatly) arrayed in her workshop. This view is untenable, however, if
post-Enlightenment thought is embraced fully.
It is apparent from his attack on the critical legal studies movement
that Walker misses the real bite of the indeterminacy critique that
gives rise to the conclusion that law is politics. Undoubtedly the pic-
ture of the Rule of Law that he paints is one that would garner wide
acceptance and deep loyalty, but the point of the indeterminacy cri-
tique is that his portrait is more an impressionistic fantasy than a real
depiction of the legal landscape. Law is political not only because
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political settlements shape the guiding norms of the legal system, but
also because even in its everyday mundane manifestations there is no
substance to legal reasoning beyond political commitment.
Decisions by common law judges are inevitably political, which in
this context means that they can not be determined by formal rational-
ity. In this regard, adjudicative decisions are no less political than a
decision by a legislative body to pass certain environmental legislation,
or a decision by a regulatory agency to set permissible pollution dis-
charges at a certain level. Walker predicates his defense of the Rule of
Law on a judiciary capable of implementing the law in a distinctly
legal manner, but the indeterminacy critique undermines the idea that
there is a methodology called "legal reasoning" that is able to bracket
the rambunctious give-and-take of political engagement. Critical legal
studies scholars do not argue that the pole of power is valued more
highly than the pole of law, they argue that we exist in a world in
which power is the only currency and law is a counterfeit ideology.11'
The pole of law is obliterated by the indeterminacy critique.11 2
Post-Enlightenment thought would appear to dissolve the possibil-
ity of legal constraint, but this seemingly removes the obstacles to
innovation within the law. If judges are not constrained, the common
law should be able to serve nicely in adjusting the legal structure to
reflect the constantly evolving "law" of the society. No longer would
an outdated rule be in need of appropriate revision or reversal-the
judge would simply act within the immediate social context. But post-
Enlightenment thought also challenges the capacity for innovation.
Simply reducing (or expanding?) the judge to an arbiter of social val-
ues does not secure the practice of innovation. Just as it is impossible
to insulate a legal text from socially contingent practices that erode the
text's claim to objectivity, it is impossible to insulate the decision
maker from these same social practices that render problematic any
innovative effort to break free from tradition." 3 The problem of inno-
vation becomes even more acute if attention simultaneously is directed
to the problem of constraint. Walker joins with Raoul Berger's criti-
cism of the United States Supreme Court for substituting an unwritten
constitution for the written Constitution having the force of law," 4
111. See generally Singer, supra note 3. See also HUTCHINSON, supra note 4.
112. I describe and critique the deconstructive variant of the indeterminacy critique more
fully in Mootz, supra note 7.
113. See J. M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1133 (1991) (arguing that the
apparent freedom of linguistic free play is severely curtailed by the ideological instantiation of the
interpreter).
114. WALKER, supra note 12, at 185 (making reference to RAOUL ]3ERGER, GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 297-98 (1977)).
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but innovation demands change in the constitutional arena no less
than the domain of private law. Clinging to the stability and certainty
of a written document seems to run counter to the image of a judge as
a creative actor retiring principles that have served their day and artic-
ulating new principles to replace them."-'
Walker's inability to deal with these basic and troubling issues stems
from his insufficient appreciation of the profound implications that fol-
low from what he takes to be the importance of contemporary quan-
tum philosophy for legal theory. Walker misses the mark by not
recognizing that this century's developments in physics were matched
by equally revolutionary developments in metaphysics. A mechanistic
view of the universe has given way to a holistic perspective, but this
shift is not simply a change in attitude toward a given object (nature)
by certain subjects (autonomous individuals). Instead, post-Enlighten-
ment metaphysics corresponds to a rather dramatic conclusion
reached by some members of the scientific community: There is no
object "out there" that is under study. General relativity theory
undermined the belief that objects are arrayed against the neutral and
absolute backdrop of space (through which time "flows") by substitut-
ing in its stead an image of four-dimensional reality. Quantum physics
has also disintegrated the subject/object distinction by establishing
that observation creates the field of observation. A more radical quan-
tum philosophy agrees that there are no "real" building blocks of
nature, but argues further that our world is a relational and holistic
system that is not subject to unlimited dissection, and in which the
dissection of the world into constituent parts is always an abstraction
from reality. As George Wright notes,
A large and increasing number of scientists and quantum philosophers
have begun to see the world as more deeply relational and holistic, and
less a matter of discrete individuals, than most of us had imagined....
... [T]he state of the overall system can not be reduced to the states
of its component parts, because the parts are simply not in definite states
in and of themselves. 6
The philosophical implications of quantum physics are far from set-
tled, but the undeniable effect under any interpretation is to discredit
the Enlightenment world view.11
7
115. Cf. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 166 (1921).
116. Wright, supra note 62, at 864, 867-68.
117. Quantum physicists have developed an incredibly successful theory for predicting
quantum phenomena, but generally they have avoided the profound questions regarding the
nature of the quantum reality giving rise to the phenomena. Under the reigning orthodoxy,
Washington Law Review Vol. 68:249, 1993
Walker follows the radical quantum theorists who argue that there
is a relation with the world that lies behind the later abstractions of
known as the Copenhagen view after Niels Bohr's home city, quantum physicists claim that
quantum mechanics holds no ontological significance. From this perspctive,
the new theoretical entities upon which physicists base their understanding of quantum
phenomena must be interpreted not as theoretical counterparts of entities existing in nature
itself, but merely as elements of a computational procedure that allows scientists to form
expectations pertaining to observations that appear under certain kinds of conditions.
NICK HERBERT, QUANTUM REALrrY: BEYOND THE NEW PHYSICS 143 (1985) (explaining that
the strict Copenhagen view is that it is nonsensical to talk about a quantum world existing
between measuring events because the "[q]uantum theory is not a representation, much less a
description, of quantum reality, but a representation of the relationship between our familiar real-
ity" of classical physics and the utterly unfamiliar realm of quantum mechanics); Henry P.
Stapp, Quantum Nonlocality and the Description of Nature, in PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES
OF QUANTUM THEORY: REFLECTIONS ON BELL'S THEORUM 154 (James T. Cushing & Ernan
McMullin eds., 1989) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES]. Under the Copenhagen
view, quantum mechanics only amounts to probabilistic predictions of the definite value that will
be manifest when the classical world, in the form of an experimenter and an experimental appa-
ratus, intervenes in the quantum world and collapses an indeterminate wave function.
As a challenge to the Copenhagen view, various philosophers and theorists have attempted to
draw ontological conclusions from quantum mechanics. See, e.g., RICHARD A. HEALEY, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF QUANTUM MECHANICS: AN INTERACTIVE INTERPRETATION 195 (1989)
(Although quantum mechanics correctly predicts observable correlations in phenomena, "adop-
tion of the strong Copenhagen interpretation effectively precludes the theory from explaining
how they come about," a project that Healey undertakes by modifying the Copenhagen view.).
Holistic theorists contend that the Copenhagen view is correct to focus on the "entire experimen-
tal arrangement" as "creating" the quantum phenomena, but they argue that the entire universe
is always part of the "entire experimental arrangement" because the uniherse is deeply relational
in a way that can not be detected by human measurement. See BOHM, supra note 9, at 1-26,
117-213; Paul Teller, Relational Holism and Quantum Mechanics, 37 BRrr. J. FOR PHIL. SCI. 71
(1986). As Bohm notes, once we accept that the "interference" of experiraental conditions affects
the "potentialities" of an electron we already seem committed to the view that there is a reality
under study. David Bohm, Heisenberg's Contribution to Physics, in THE UNCERTAINTY PRINCI-
PLE AND FOUNDATIONS OF QUANTUM MECHANICS: A FIFrY YEARS' SURVEY 559 (William C.
Price & Seymour S. Chissick eds., 1977).
The distinction between the anti-realist orthodoxy of the Copenhagm view and the realist
holism advocated by Bohm and others is brought into sharper focus by considering the now
experimentally confirmed necessity of accepting some manner of nonlocality within quantum
mechanics in order to predict phenomena correctly. See, eg., Abner Shimony, The Reality of the
Quantum World, 258 SCI. AM. 46 (1988). Nonlocality essentially amounts to acausal instantane-
ous connections between quantum phenomena. Although related to holism, nonlocaity evi-
dences nonseparability, which concerns spatial relationships. Richari Healey, Holism and
Nonseparability, 88 J. PHIL. 393 (1991). Nonlocality might be explained by faster than light
communication between quantum events, which really amounts to redefining "local" causation,
but this supposition violates the theory of special relativity. Nonlocality is one of several baffling
events predicted by quantum mechanics that "not only resist explanation, they actually under-
mine a cluster of metaphysical beliefs .... Thus scientific theory, far from being derived from
metaphysical beliefs, may require us to revise them." R.I.G. Hughes, Bell's Theorem, Ideology,
and Structural Explanation, in PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES, supra, at 195-96. As one
commentator succinctly states: "Metaphysics follows physics in fact as well as in Aristotle."
Healey, Holism and Nonseparability, supra, at 393.
The orthodox reponse to the problem of explaining nonlocality is straightforward: Nonlocality
is a feature of the mathematical models but does not exist in the real world. For example, Arthur
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Enlightenment thought in general and Enlightenment science in par-
Fine agrees that the hypothesis of superluminal influences provides the best explanation of the
correlations of pairs of events, but further argues that there simply is no need for an explanation
of patterns existing between random sequences in an algorithm. Arthur Fine, Do Correlations
Need To Be Explained?, in PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES, supra, at 175, 182-83, 192. These
anti-realists argue strenuously that the presumption of realism simply is inconsistent with quan-
tum mechanics. HENRIK SMITH, INTRODUCTION TO QUANTUM MECHANICS 255-57 (1991); N.
David Mermin, Quantum Mysteries Revisited, 58 AM. J. PHYSICS 731 (1990).
In contrast, Bohm and other holistic theorists contend that it is unnecessary to embrace anti-
realism if we are willing to surrender our fragmented conception of reality and accept the holistic
character of nature. Holistic theorists argue that the experimental data confirming nonlocality
and the constraints of special relativity can both be accomodated under their approach. Nonlo-
cal influences are not a matter of faster-than-light communication between two separate objects.
Instead they evidence a fundamental undivided wholeness that precedes our fragmentary view
that there is need for causal communication between distinct objects. BOHM, supra note 9, at
1-26, 48-64. Paul Teller contends that it is only our prejudicial adherence to "particularism"
that renders quantum mechanics incompatible with relatavistic theories. Teller defines particu-
larism as the commitment to a world composed of individuals bearing nonrelational properties
such that relations between individuals supervene on these nonrelational properties. In contrast,
Teller argues in favor of "relational holism," under which relations exist "which do not super-
vene on the nonrelational properties of the relata." Paul Teller, Relativity, Relational Holism,
and the Bell Inequalities, in PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES, supra, at 208, 214. Reasoning
that relational holism permits us to make sense of nonlocality because it rejects the ontology of
particularism, Teller writes that:
To say that causal locality has been violated most plausibly should be taken to mean that
there are nonrelational properties of space-time points which are related in some other
way-by action (lawlike dependencies) at a distance or through superliminal causal chains.
On the other hand, when we are concerned with nonsupervening relations, this circle of
ideas has no grip. There is no question of superluminal or distant action between nonrela-
tional, definite values.
Id. at 215; cf Stapp, supra, at 159 ("Far more likely, in my opinion, than anything actually
traveling faster than light is the likelihood of an intrinsic connectedness of Nature that is alien to
the classical notion that spatial separation entails intrinsic separation."). This holistic approach
does not render science meaningless:
Perhaps it is possible to adopt a kind of radical ontological holism in which the whole of the
forward light cone of any event is regarded as one nonseparable whole because of the perva-
siveness of physical interactions, and yet to do this without lapsing into the silence of scien-
tific nirvana. That is to say, maybe we can opt for radical ontological holism and still do
some physics.
Or to put the idea differently, the universe is "really" one, but once we put a specific
question to it, it falls apart quite naturally into apparent parts.
Don Howard, Holism, Separability, and the Metaphysical Implications of the Bell Experiments, in
PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES, supra, at 252-53.
Although I argue that the holistic and nonseparability themes relied on by Walker have strong
affinities with the post-Enlightenment metaphysics of Gadamer's hermeneutics, the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum mechanics also lends itself to the metaphysical shift away from the
subject/object framework that is signalled by hermeneutics. See Hans Siegfried, Autonomy and
Quantum Physics: Nietsche, Heidigger, and Heisenberg, 57 PHIL. ScI. 619, 629 (1990) (arguing
that "[w]hat quantum physics provides is not a representation of nature (Bild von der Natur), but
a representation of our relationship to nature... quantum physics deals this ontology [the Carte-
sian dichotomy of reflecting mind and objective matter] a much harder blow than Heideggarian
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ticular. A prominent theoretical physicist, David Bohm, believes that
only a holistic view accords with quantum mechanics. Bohm writes of
the "implicate order" of reality that subtends the subtotalities com-
prising the objects of everyday existence. 11 8
[T]he attempt to live according to the notion that the fragments [i.e., our
conception of objects] are really separate is, in essence, what has led to
the growing series of extremely urgent crises that is confronting us
today.
... [S]cience itself is demanding a new, non-fragmentary world view,
in the sense that the present approach of analysis of the world into inde-
pendently existent parts does not work very well in mo:lern physics...
both in relativity theory and quantum theory, notions implying the
undivided wholeness of the universe would provide a much more
orderly way of considering the general nature of reality.
phenomenology"); Williams, supra note 62, at 449. Of course, Gadarner's philosophy is not
validated by any particular scientific discovery, theory, or philosophy.
Gadamer's approach is meant to breach the realist/anti-realist vocabalary that characterizes
much of the quantum philosophy debate. See, eg., Joseph J. Kockelmans, Beyond Realism and
Idealism: A Response to Patrick A. Heelan, in GADAMER AND HERMENEUTics 229 (Hugh J.
Silverman ed., 1991). Orthodox theorists who deride the holistic position as being wrong and
outlandish reinscribe Enlightenment prejudices that there can be neutral and rational scientific
knowledge that accumulates according to ahistorical criteria. In fact, the Copenhagen interpre-
tation is just that: an interpretation that has a social history. See DAID C. CASSIDY, UNCER-
TAINTY: THE LIFE AND SCIENCE OF WERNER HEISENBERG 247-66 (1992).
118. See BOHM, supra note 9, at 207. Bohm describes his central theme to be "the unbroken
wholeness of the totality of existence as an undivided flowing movement without borders.... So
whatever part, element, or aspect we may abstract in thought, this still enfolds the whole and is
therefore intrinsically related to the totality from which it has been abstracted." Id. at 172. One
commentator, drawing in part on Bohm's work, explains further:
This entirety of interrelation is so vast in its extent across cultural ir eaning and historical
space and time that from a long anthropological perspective we begin to see in it but one
large tissue of distributed life and cognition woven across the sphere cf the earth. In all its
flux of intensity and exchange, this noetic web is the ecology of conc ousness-the field of
conciousness of which each of us is a dynamic and reflexive node.
Guy Burneko, It Happens by Itsel. The Tao of Cooperation, Systems Theory, and Constitutive
Hermeneutics, 31 WORLD FUTURES 139, 140 (1991). For additional commentary on the philo-
sophical and religious implications of Bohm's work, see PHYSICS AND THE ULTIMATE SIGNIFI-
CANCE OF TIME: BOHM, PRIGONINE AND PROCESS PHILOSOPHY (David R. Griffen ed., 1986);
Ronald H. McKinney, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Lonergan Versus Bohm, 64 MODERN
SCHOOLMAN 97 (1987); Alicia J. Roque, Could Bohm's Hologram Succeed Where Rorty's Mirror
Couldn't?, 121 SCIENTIA 141-51 (1986); John A. Schumacher, Prolegomena to Any Future
Inquiry: The Paradigm of Undivided Wholeness, 21 INT'L PHIL. Q. 439 (1981); Sharpe, supra





... [W]hat is needed is for man to give attention to his fragmentary
thought, to be aware of it, and thus bring it to an end.1 19
Bohm argues that it is only the supposition of undivided wholeness
that provides the much sought-after unified theory that enables us to
reconcile relativity and quantum mechanics.12 Bohm's philosophy is
as contested as post-Enlightenment thought generally, but if Walker is
serious about reformulating the Rule of Law in accordance with the
post-Enlightenment condition, he must follow through on the far-
reaching ramifications of the new physics that he considers.
It is obvious, however, that Walker draws back from the radical
subject-decentering conclusions of the holistic theorists. Under
Walker's view, a judge is presumed to be a dispassionate observer who
first determines the facts of a dispute and then objectively extracts
from prior decisions time-tested neutral principles that always stand
apart from the judge's subjective aims. Walker interprets the new
physics as simply confirming the older metaphysical belief in individu-
als who are distinct from the natural and social worlds even as they
are inevitably interactive with both. Walker looks in the right direc-
tion, but he fails to move. Relativity and quantum theory have
profound implications for legal theory, but Walker only skims the sur-
face by concluding that legislation cannot treat the ills of society like
so many broken crankshafts on the social engine. What is at issue is
our relationship with the world, which under the emerging view is
irremediably context-driven and interpretive. 121 This is the milieu in
which cls scholars intensified the realists' attack on the formalist con-
ception of adjudication. Walker stands mute before this challenge and
appears to recoil from the deeper implications of the shifting world
view of which he purportedly takes account.
Walker contends that the lessons of post-Enlightenment thought
afford a "new importance and dignity to the individual" because social
engineering is rendered practically impossible and therefore obso-
lete. 12 2 With this claim, Walker makes the mistake of according fun-
damental significance to autonomous individual actors who
spontaneously collide and thereby produce a social content that is
119. BOHM, supra note 9, at 2, xi-xii, 7.
120. Id. at 176.
121. Joan Williams provides a lucid account of the broad contours of a "new epistemology"
that has followed in the wake of the breakdown of the positivist model, under which there is no
false hope of "neutral" interpretation of objective meanings. Williams, supra note 62. Williams
criticizes critical legal studies scholars for not adhering to the broadest "second wave"
implications of the new epistemology and instead remaining within the ambit of (modified)
Enlightenment epistemology. Id. at 471-95.
122. WALKER, supra note 12, at 56.
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beyond any individual ken. Walker fails to recognize that the notion
of an "individual" must take on new meaning in the post-Enlighten-
ment world. As George Wright argues,
Perhaps the best way to accommodate this [traditionad Western] sense
of individualism with the experimentally revealed facts of the world is to
think, as the philosopher Paul Teller suggests, in terms of "relational
holism." According to relational holism, "objects which in at least
some circumstances we can identify as separate individuals have inher-
ent relations, that is, relations which do not supervene on the non-rela-
tional properties of the distinct individuals." We do not, as it were, start
with non-social human beings who then contingently choose to, or
somehow wind up, changing their identities by entering into social rela-
tionships-altruistic, manipulative, sacrificial, or exploitive. Rather, the
identity of the human being is constituted as primarily or fundamentally
by social relationships as by any other aspect of that person. Identity is,
in part, identity-sharing. What some mystics and sociologists have long
argued for turns out to be suggestively reinforced, if not confirmed, by
physics. 123
Individuals exist, but they are socially defined and historically situ-
ated. It no longer makes sense to talk of individuals as the separate
component parts of the social world. In fact, Bohm's claim that a
holistic quantum reality subtends the curious phenomena observed by
quantum physicists leads him to suggest that even the distinctions
between animate and inanimate, consciousness and matter, and space
and time must all be considered explications of a more fundamental
implicate unity. The self-aggrandizing notion of a secure subject is
quite simply incoherent once one abandons the mechanistic view of
the universe that marked the period of Enlightenment. 24
The holism suggested by radical quantum theorists is anathema to
Hayek's liberalism. Although Walker attempts to avoid Hayek's lim-
ited approach, Walker's residual commitment to traditional individu-
alism is apparent from the way in which he bifurcates the legal and
social systems. Although he notes that under a post-Enlightenment
understanding the government cannot view itself as distinct from soci-
ety, Walker's entire definitional structure belies this insight. Purport-
ing to champion only a "negative state" that does not proactively
123. Wright, supra note 62, at 868 (quoting Teller, Relational Holism and Quantum
Mechanics, supra note 117, at 73 (footnotes omitted)).
124. Thus, an illusion may arise in which the manifest static and fragmented content of
consciousness is experienced as the very basis of reality and from this illusion one may
apparently obtain a proof of the correctness of that mode of thought in which this content is
taken to be fundamental.




intervene in the social world, Walker sees the legal system as a neutral
backdrop for the social interaction of individuals. At its core this is
simply Hayek's individualism, a perspective that does not take account
of the "curvature of legal space."12 It hardly seems to make sense to
talk about "social values" that develop against the backdrop of a neu-
tral legal order when the legal system indelibly shapes the social world
and is indivisibly one with it.
Walker looks to the developing post-Enlightenment world view for
guidance, but he fails to assimilate the radical quality of its central
theme: individuals are constituted socially and legal relations are
bound up inextricably with social relations. The old vision of common
law judges breathing life into legal doctrine must be revised by
acknowledging that social traditions, such as are expressed in the law,
breathe life into the judge. Theorists must reconcile the desire for a
purely formal and procedural implementation of the Rule of Law with
the substantive conception of prudential governance by utilizing post-
Enlightenment terms that erase the supposed sharp distinction
between a positive legal rule and the social context of its proper appli-
cation. To put it differently, the Rule of Law must be reconceived in
terms that avoid the unhelpful bifurcation of subjects and objects.
Although Walker ultimately fails to reconceive the Rule of Law in this
manner, his efforts provide a backdrop for exploring the way in which
Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophy undertakes this task in a more
profitable manner.
B. A Post-Enlightenment Understanding of the Rule of Law
Walker's attempt to render the Rule of Law coherent in post-
Enlightenment terms is not doomed to failure. The Rule of Law can
be preserved as a useful description of certain features of legal practice
by eschewing Enlightenment metaphysics. Walker's thesis is on the
125. See generally Tribe, supra note 62. In his discussion of the "curvature of constitutional
space," Tribe writes that:
In Einstein's view, space is not the neutral "stage" upon which the play is acted, but
rather is merely one actor among others, all of whom interact in the unfolding of the story.
A parallel conception in the legal universe would hold that, just as space can not extricate
itself from the unfolding story of physical reality, so also the law can not extract itself from
social structures ....
Discerning the social meaning of a [constitutionally] challenged practice... demands less
an effort to uncover the hidden levers, gears or forces that translate governmental actions
into objective effects, than an attempt to feel the contours of the world government has built
Id. at 7, 39.
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mark, but his failure to break free of Enlightenment metaphysics
problemizes his effort. If the Rule of Law is to be preserved in the face
of the demands for power by the technocratic elite, it is apparent that
Walker's entire project must be recast. Elsewhere, I have articulated a
critical hermeneutical approach that draws upon pcst-Enlightenment
Continental philosophical traditions and provides an appropriate
vocabulary with which to discuss legal practice. 126 Viewed from the
perspective of hermeneutics, Walker's reliance on an adjudicative
model rather than on legislative competencies to defend the Rule of
Law is not happenstance. Walker's commitment to the Rule of Law is
grounded in the practice of judging because the Rule of Law is exper-
ienced most acutely in this practice. However, Walker is unable to
break free completely from wrongheaded notions of how the features
of the Rule of Law are related and grounded in practice because he
remains committed to Enlightenment metaphysical presuppositions.
Although Walker's analysis leaves much undone, a hermeneutical
approach helps carry forward the impulse to regard the Rule of Law
as a useful political doctrine by rethinking it based on our experience
of legal practice. 1
27
In this section, I provide a hermeneutical account; of legal practice
that accords with the powerful challenges to the activities of under-
standing and knowing posed by post-Enlightenment conceptions of
science. Fred Dallmayr recently outlined a persuasive argument that
Rule of Law jurisprudence inevitably must incorporate the lessons of
contemporary hermeneutics if we are to avoid incoherence and
aporia.128 In doing so, Dallmayr highlights many of the issues that are
raised in Walker's analysis. Dallmayr traces the intellectual lineage of
the concept of the Rule of Law from its original close nexus with full-
bodied political philosophy to the formal and procedural positivist
vision that gained supremacy in the Enlightenment period. 29  This
development engendered a political crisis because Western democra-
cies simultaneously were committed to the sovereignty of positive law
and also to the "material dimension" of law-the linkage of law to
foundational social norms.'30 As related above, Walker dubs this
apparent aporia "Dicey's paradox," and argues that aporia is avoided
126. See generally Mootz, supra note 5.
127. Of course, legal judgments evidencing the Rule of Law are made not only by judges but
also by lawyers and clients.
128. Dallmayr, supra note 6, at 1464-69.
129. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
130. Dallmayr, supra note 6, at 1458-59 (discussing FRANZ NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW:
POLITICAL THEORY AND THE LEGAL SYSrM IN MODERN SOCIETY (1986), as keenly




because all positive law must be interpreted and is not self-execut-
ing."' Implicit in Walker's approach is the belief that when positive
law is interpreted it is infused with material law, thereby dissolving the
conflict, but Walker's metaphysical presuppositions prevent him from
exploring this practice in a satisfactory way. In Dallmayr's estima-
tion, contemporary hermeneutics enables the political theorist to wend
a path between the opposing traditions by bringing together the con-
vention of rule-governance and the invention of politics in a post-
Enlightenment articulation of legal practice.132 Only if we remain
wedded to the Enlightenment perspective do we perceive as distinct
and irreconcilable the dual objectives of propounding constraining
rules and fostering innovative practice.
The rejection of the Enlightenment perspective within contempo-
rary hermeneutics largely is defined by the German philosopher Hans-
Georg Gadamer and his magnum opus, Truth and Method. 133 Prior to
Gadamer's efforts, hermeneutics traditionally had been regarded as
the discipline of formulating rules to serve as pragmatic aids to under-
standing particular types of texts. Theological, legal, and literary her-
meneutics developed as separate disciplines that at most tended to
share general characteristics. Under the influence of the Enlighten-
ment, however, hermeneutics was transformed in an attempt to
develop a unified science of meaning divorced from the dogmatic and
practical aims of the various disciplines. Gadamer rejects the Enlight-
enment goal of developing a unified science of hermeneutics. He con-
tends that this general methodological view of hermeneutics is
derivative of a more fundamental inquiry into what it means to inter-
pret and understand, an investigation of the way we exist in the world.
Contemporary hermeneutics is concerned with the seamless web of
truth and meaning that we constantly renew, an intersubjective
belonging that lies behind the later methodological attempts to repair
localized problems of meaning. In Gadamer's hands, hermeneutics
becomes nothing less than the philosophical investigation of existence,
and so Gadamer describes his inquiry as "philosophical
hermeneutics." 134
and politics or between reason and willing has been intensified in our century to the point of
antithesis and complete incommensurability." Id at 1458.
131. WALKER, supra note 12, at 128-39.
132. Dallmayr, supra note 6, at 1450.
133. See generally GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 10.
134. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, On the Origins of Philosophical Hermeneutics, in
PHILOSOPHICAL APPRENTICESHIPS, supra note 10, at 177-93.
293
Washington Law Review
Gadamer is the quintessential post-Enlightenment philosopher inas-
much as the guiding premise of his philosophical hermeneutics is to
leave behind the ahistorical subject that is presumed by Enlightenment
physics and Cartesian metaphysics and to uncover the historical and
intersubjective (interpretive) mode of being that we embody. In the
Introduction to Truth and Method, Gadamer sets his agenda in plain
terms.
The understanding and the interpretation of texts is not merely a con-
cern of science, but obviously belongs to human experience of the world
in general. The hermeneutic phenomenon is basically not a problem of
method at all. It is not concerned with a method of understanding by
means of which texts are subjected to scientific investigation like all
other objects of experience. It is not concerned primarily with amassing
verified knowledge, such as would satisfy the methodological ideal of
science-yet it too is concerned with knowledge and with truth. In
understanding tradition not only are texts understood, but insights are
acquired and truths known. But what kind of knowledge and what kind
of truth?
Given the dominance of modern science in the philosophical elucida-
tion and justification of the concept of knowledge and the concept of
truth, this question does not appear legitimate. Yet it is unavoidable,
even within the sciences. The phenomenon of understanding not only
pervades all human relations to the world. It also has an independent
validity within science, and it resists any attempt to reinterpret it in
terms of scientific method. The following investigaticns start with the
resistance in modern science itself to the universal claim of scientific
method. They are concerned to seek the experience of truth that tran-
scends the domain of scientific method wherever that experience is to be
found, and to inquire into its legitimacy.
135
Gadamer directs his inquiry to the truthful relat:.on that subtends
modem science, a truthful relation defined by our historical and finite
existence.13 6 As the tremors within the Enlightenment self-under-
standing of modem science begin to manifest themselves, Gadamer's
philosophy reverberates the shared message: The picture of a monadic
subject decoding the world of objects is a mirage.
An overview of some of Gadamer's principal themes reveals that his
philosophy has strong affinities with holistic quantum philosophy.
13 7
135. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 10, at xxi-xxii.
136. Gadamer writes that his purpose is not "to make prescriptions for the sciences or the
conduct of life, but to try to correct false thinking about what they ar:." Id. at xxiii
137. While writing this Article, I was rather surprised to find an article by Guy Burneko in
which he relies on themes of Taoist philosophy, Bohm's quantum theory, and Gadamer's




Gadamer stresses that interpretation is never an attitude of a subject
toward the world, but instead is something that precedes and informs
our notion of subjectivity. In the parlance of Continental philosophy,
interpretation is not an activity, it is a mode of being-in-the-world.
This distinction underscores Gadamer's rejection of the view of the
individual subject as a self-directing center of knowledge. The belief
that we exercise power over the world by casting our interpretations
(be they scientific or aesthetic) over the objects comprising the world
arises from the metaphysical foundations of Enlightenment thought.
In contrast, being-in-the-world undermines the prominence accorded
to the subject by capturing the truthful relation from which we derive
our conceptions of subjectivity. 13 8
Gadamer describes the mode of being that precedes subjectivity as a
playful fusion of horizons. 139 This characterization requires unpack-
ing. Both the subject as interpreter and the text as interpreted are
finite and historical; each are limited by a "horizon" and are incapable
of achieving an acontextual bird's eye view of the whole. The inter-
preter comes to the text with certain prejudices, or prejudgments, that
define her personal history. Similarly, the text comes to the inter-
preter with a certain history of interpretations and uses that shape
what Gadamer terms its "effective-history." It is important not to
confuse Gadamer's use of the image of a horizon with a resuscitation
of the subject/object bifurcation of Enlightenment thought. For
Gadamer, the horizons of the interpreter and the text are never closed
or fixed, just as the horizon of the landscape is not fixed as we drive
toward it. The interpreter and the text are never distinct entities
because they share a tradition embodied in language. Both horizons
are rooted in tradition and open to the experience of meaning through
cooperative. See Burneko, supra note 118. Burneko articulates his holistic theory of cooperation
in familiar Gadamerian terms:
[W]e can never come to an overview of the whole with systematic "method" but always find
ourselves "underway" ....
, * * [T]here is no foundational apodicity to be derived from any of the cooperating
elements; they are all reciprocally and mutually constitutive in their being and meaning.
Only in the light of this (never complete) whole, perhaps, then, is there truth and ethical
good .... The path is the goal.
Id. at 154.
138. Gadamer captures the ego-decentering thrust of his philosophy by using the give and
take of a conversation as a model. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 10, at 383
("[Tihe more genuine a conversation is, the less its conduct lies within the will of either
partner.").
139. Mootz, supra note 5, at 534-38. See generally GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra
note 10, at 101-10, 300-07 (describing the concept of play and the fusion of horizons).
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a "fusion" based on the commonality of tradition. As a result, the
interpreter's
interpretation is itself a reappropriation, a further development of the
very tradition to which both he and his object belong. In Gadamer's
view, this substantive circle has a positive significance, for it ensures that
there is some common ground between the interpreter's horizon of
expectations and the material that he is studying, that his points of refer-
ence for understanding the tradition have a basis in that tradition
itself. 1
4
The interpreter and the text, then, are always historical manifestations
of a shared tradition, and interpretation is always a reappropriation of
this shared tradition to the questions of the present.
Gadamer argues that the experience of playing a game is a model of
the fusion of horizons.14 1 When a game is played it is not the partici-
pants who play the game so much as it is the game that plays the
participants.142 Gadamer emphasizes that the "mode of being of play
is not such that, for the game to be played, there must be a subject who
is behaving playfully," but rather the playing occurs "not only without
goal or purpose but also without effort. It happens, as it were, by
itself."143 Understanding is a putting at risk before the force of the
text that results in the playful testing of both the text's effective-history
and the individual's prejudices. By virtue of interpretation the individ-
ual, the text and the tradition are transformed in an event of
understanding. 144
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics restructures metaphysics in
a fashion similar to the restructuring of physics by radical quantum
theorists. Wholeness and unity pervade both perspectives, and any
attempt to divorce the knowing subject from that which is known is
viewed as an abstraction from the truthful relation that makes all
knowledge possible. As a physicist, Bohm argues that we must view
the natural world as a unity that precedes and makes possible our later
140. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE CRITICAL THEORY OF JURGEN HABERMAS 175 (1978).
141. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 10, at 101-34; Mootz, supra note 5, at
531-32.
142. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 10, at 106.
143. Id. at 103, 105.
144. Gadamer is well aware that individuals may refuse to play along, or may even cheat, in
order to secure advantages and to insulate their prejudices from the challenges of interpretation.
As an example, Gadamer cites the problem of the despotic ruler who is able to enforce his
decisions "without regard for the law-that is without the effort of interpretation," and
concludes that in this circumstance "hermeneutics can not exist." Id. at 329. Gadamer's entire
effort is to demonstrate that such a situation runs counter to our way of existing and exemplifies





attempts to extricate ourselves and to dismantle it like a machine.1 45
As a philosopher, Gadamer argues that we must view our cultural
world as an all-encompassing tradition that precedes, motivates, and
permits our later attempts to take up a position regarding our tradi-
tional knowledge. For both thinkers, the cardinal error of modernity
is the violent fragmentation of the natural and cultural worlds ushered
in by the Enlightenment.
Ultimately, the very idea of different natural and cultural worlds of
inquiry must fall in the face of our situated hermeneutical condi-
tion.1 46 Bohm admits that his vision of the "implicate order" of the
universe is itself a tradition-bound inquiry that will never be able to
seize the essential truth of an "objective world" that stands distinct
from our involvement with it. Bohm carefully rejects an Enlighten-
ment reduction of his holism to a notion of the world of nature
existing undisturbed "out there."
Is this ground [the "implicate order"] the absolute end of everything?
In our proposed views concerning the general nature of "the totality of
all that is" we regard even this ground as a mere stage, in the sense that
there could in principle be an infinity of further development beyond
it.... [T]his proposal becomes itself an active factor in the totality of
existence which includes ourselves as well as the objects of our thoughts
and experimental investigations. Any further proposals on this process
will, like those already made, have to be viable That is to say, one will
require of them a general self-consistency as well as consistency in what
flows from them in life as a whole. Through the force of an even deeper
more inward necessity in this totality, some new state of affairs may
emerge in which both the world as we know it and our ideas about it
may undergo an unending processes [sic] of yet further change. 147
145. See supra notes 9, 63, 117, 118, and 138.
146. See RICHARD W. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE,
HERMENEUTICS AND PRAXIS (1983) (discussing the failure of the Enlightenment model of
knowledge for both natural science and the humanities and the necessity of recovering a sense of
rationality through a hermeneutical project of cultivating a vibrant community of dialogue). For
example, Patrick Heelan argues that perception is a hermeneutical activity, thereby rejecting the
Enlightenment idea that perception amounts to the reception of pre-existing, brute sensory data
that exists independently of the act of perception. PATRICK A. HEELAN, SPACE-PERCEPTION
AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (1983); cf M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF
PERCEPTION (Colin Smith trans., 1962). "Since perception is hermeneutical, its contents, and a
fortiori the contents of scientific observation, will never be unique, final, definitive, absolute, and
apart from history and particular social and cultural milieux. From this it follows that there is a
history of perception." Patrick A. Heelan, Perception as a Henneneutical Act, 37 REv.
METAPHYSICS 61, 75 (1983). Gadamer's discussion closely parallels Heelan's, with Gadamer
concluding that "[p]ure seeing and pure hearing are dogmatic abstractions that artificially reduce
phenomena. Perception always includes meaning." GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra
note 10, at 89-92.
147. BOHM, supra note 9, at 213.
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Gadamer captures this idea of an underlying dynamism by emphasiz-
ing the never-ending dialogical development of tradition through its
constant and unavoidable appropriation by contemporary interpreters.
Gadamer discusses the way in which the world reveals its meaning to
us, a revelation that always precedes both the natusal and social sci-
ences. Therefore, the traditional methodological disputes between the
natural and human sciences only obscure the more fundamental ques-
tion addressed by Gadamer. "The question I have asked seeks to dis-
cover and bring into consciousness something which methodological
dispute serves only to conceal and neglect, something that does not so
much confine or limit modem science as precede it and make it
possible."' 148
Having demonstrated that Gadamer's historical, non-subjectivist
philosophy is in accord with post-Enlightenment thought as exhibited
by Bohm's holistic quantum philosophy, the question remains whether
Gadamer's philosophy is able to make sense of the Rule of Law in
post-Enlightenment terms. Discussing this issue dees not require an
extrapolation of Gadamer's thesis because Gadamer directly argues
148. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 10, at xxix. Gadiuner does not claim that
philosophy is the "master science" that grounds the natural and human sciences, but only that
the style of questioning that is philosophy is instructive for all our modes of knowing. The
French phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, explored this distinction as part of his
discussion of the uneasy relationship between philosophy and sociolog).
We need neither tear down the behavioral sciences to lay the foundations of philosophy, nor
tear down philosophy to lay the foundations of the behavioral sciences. Every science
secretes an ontology; every ontology anticipates a body of knowledge. It is up to us to come
to terms with this situation and see to it that both philosophy and science are possible.
... Since we are all hemmed in by history, it is up to us to understand that whatever truth
we may have is to be gotten not in spite of but through our historical inherence.
Superficially considered, our inherence destroys all truth; considered radically, it founds a
new idea of truth. As long as I cling to the idea of an absolute spectator, of knowledge with
no point of view, I can see my situation as nothing but a source of error. But if I have once
recognized that through it I am grafted onto every action and all knowledge which can have
a meaning for me, and that step by step it contains everything which can exist for me, then
my contact with the social in the finitude of my situation is revealed to me as the point of
origin of all truth, including scientific truth. And since we have an ilea of truth, since we
are in truth and can not escape it, the only thing left for me to do is to define a truth in the
situation.
... Philosophy is not a particular body of knowledge; it is the vigilance which does not let
us forget the source of all knowledge.
.. Philosophy is irreplaceable because it reveals to us both the movement by which lives
become truths, and the circularity of that singular being who in a certain sense already is
everything he happens to think
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, SIGNS 98-113 (Richards C. McCleary trans., 1964).
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that the practice of law has exemplary significance for expressing our
post-Enlightenment interpretive relation with the world. 149 Gadamer
argues that legal hermeneutics "serves to remind us what the real pro-
cedure of the human sciences is" because legal interpretation, unlike
biblical and literary hermeneutics, retained its pragmatic character
rather than becoming ensnared in Enlightenment methodology."' 0
Gadamer believes that the real procedure of humanistic inquiry is cap-
tured by Aristotle's notion of ethical knowledge as phronesis, roughly
translated as deliberative-practical wisdom, and that the practice of
common law judging exemplifies phronesis. 15 Because the practical
demands placed on the judge to render a judgment do not permit the
judge to adopt the pretense of a disengaged commentator as literary
critic, the practice of judging embodies a particular knowledge that
holds important lessons for a post-Enlightenment world.
To develop the concept of phronesis, Gadamer recalls Aristotle's
discussion of different ways of knowing. Aristotle distinguishes
phronesis from both techne and episteme. 152 Techne is knowledge ori-
ented toward making rather than acting, and includes knowledge of
arts like architecture rather than knowledge in the form of practical
wisdom exercised by moral actors within a community.153 Episteme
is knowledge of "things that are universal and necessary," and
includes knowledge of indubitable and timeless truths such as mathe-
matical relationships. 5a In contrast, however, phronesis as moral
judgment plainly is not reducible to a calculus of certain truths, nor is
it simply the application of a learned skill to a concrete situation.
Therefore,
149. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 10, at 324-41.
150. Id. at 327. Gadamer compares legal and theological hermeneutics thus:
Schleiermacher consciously placed [theological hermeneutics] wholly within general
hermeneutics and merely regarded it as a special application of it. Since then, scientific
theology's claim to be a discipline on a par with the modem historical sciences seems to
depend on the fact that no laws and rules are to be applied in interpreting Scripture other
than those used in understanding any other traditionary material. Thus there could no
longer be any such thing as a specifically theological hermeneutics.... [In contrast, legal
hermeneutics] was separated from theory of understanding as a whole because it has a
dogmatic purpose, just as, by giving up its dogmatic commitment, theological hermeneutics
was united with philological-historical method.
Id. at 324-25
151. Id. at 312-24 ("The Hermeneutic Relevance of Aristotle").
152. ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in 9 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1140a-1140b (W. D.
Ross trans., 1925).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1140b.
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[t]he task of making a moral decision is that of doing the right thing in a
particular situation-i.e., seeing what is right within the situation and
grasping it.
[W]e do not possess moral knowledge in such a way that we
already have it and then apply it to specific situations.'
55
Aristotle's analysis of ethical knowledge is a model of hermeneutical
understanding because applying a text is never "relating some pre-
given universal to the particular situation," but instead is always the
work of an interpreter relating a text to his particular situation, which
always involves a creative fusion of horizons. 156 Gadamer argues that
this is precisely the situation of a judge rendering a decision, and that
the character of legal practice tells us something of the nature of truth
in a post-Enlightenment world.
Gadamer explains that judging exemplifies the hermeneutical act
because applying "the law is not simply a matter of knowing the law"
as a universal prescription. 157 A judge makes the law concrete by ren-
dering a judgment. Legal judgment can not be determined in advance
according to a neutral calculus. Nor can legal judgment simply be the
result of the interpreter's skill at approximating the model "decision"
in the way that a carpenter might skillfully build a table, having in
mind the model "table."' 58 The judge must render a decision in
155. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 10, at 317. Arisotle makes this point as
follows:
Regarding practical wisdom we shall get at the truth by considering who are the persons
we credit with it. Now it is thought to be the mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able
to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular
respect, e.g. about what sorts of thing conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts
of thing conduce to the good life in general. This is shown by the fact that we credit men
with practical wisdom in some particular respect when they have calculated well with a veiw
to some good end which is one of those that are not the object of any art. It follows that in
the general sense also the man who is capable of deliberating has practical wisdom....
[P]ractical wisdom can not be scientific knowledge nor art; not science because that which
can be done is capable of being otherwise, not art because action and making are different
kinds of thing. The remaining alternative, then, is that it is a true and reasoned state of
capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man. For while making
has an end other than itself, action can not; for good action itself is its end. It is for this
reason that we think Pericles and men like him have practical wisdom, viz. because they can
see what is good for themselves and what is good for men in general ....
ARISTOTLE, supra note 152, at 1 140a-1 140b.
156. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 10, at 324.
157. Id. at 330.
158. P. Christopher Smith makes this point with clarity and precision in his critique of
pragmatic ethical theory in the tradition of techne by drawing out the ethical implications of




response to the demands of the case at hand, which amounts to noth-
ing less than the "just weighing-up" of the whole tradition as it is
embodied in her prejudices and in the effective history of text.15 9 In
judicial reasoning the hermeneutical situation is clearly presented: Our
interpretive relation with the world is not a subjective attitude but is
instead belonging to a shared tradition in which the notion of the good
or just is constantly renewed and created. The Rule of Law is pre-
served in the post-Enlightenment world, then, to the same degree that
the status of moral reasoning is preserved. Of course, it is more accu-
rate to say that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics rescues both
the Rule of Law and moral reasoning from their current desuetude in
the wake of the Enlightenment's glorification of epistemic and techni-
cal-practical knowledge at the expense ofphronesis. From Gadamer's
perspective, the Rule of Law demands that legal actors suspend the
subjectivist strategies that blunt the powerful openness that reasoning
within a tradition affords.
It may not be clear what we have gained by following the route
suggested by Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics rather than the
tack taken by Walker, inasmuch as both Gadamer and Walker look to
the practice of judging as the sine qua non of the Rule of Law. 6 ° Is
Gadamer's philosophy simply theoretical window-dressing for the jus-
tification of the same judicial practice defended by Walker from an
Enlightenment perspective? Certainly not. Gadamer analogizes legal
reasoning to moral reasoning because both develop an ongoing tradi-
tional knowledge without a fixed telos in view. In contrast, Walker
recognizes that the judge is given over to tradition, but the judge
remains central as the creative actor carefully adjusting tradition when
the need arises. For Walker, the judge is a subject who displays a
practical skill or craft in fashioning from the unfinished common law
the legal doctrine that is called for by the circumstances. In short,
159. GADAMER, TRUTh AND METHOD, supra note 10, at 329. The capacity to make
judgments in this way is often characterized as practical reasoning. In response to critics who
argue that positivist formalism is necessary for the Rule of Law because practical reasoning is too
uncertain to guide judicial decisions, Daniel Farber describes current understanding of cognitive
processes utilized by experts as being neither intuitionistic nor the application of a formal,
deductive logic. Farber, supra note 15, at 541-42. Farber equates practical reasoning with
Llewellyn's notions of a judge using her "situation sense," and describes it as "the ability to take
a complex set of facts, identify the key relevant attitudes, and understand their societal
significance." Id. at 536. Just as an expert radiologist learns his skill by following examples of
others and by a process of trial and error, a judge is able to "understand and reason through a
problem, which is subject to criticism and assessment by legal observers." Id. at 558.
160. It is important to emphasize that judges are not the only persons who must exercise legal
judgment, although judges have the last word. Walker properly emphasizes that the judgment of
police officers, prosecutors, and legislators also should be subject to the Rule of Law.
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Walker's judge is no less a rationalizing figure than a Newtonian phys-
icist, and Walker would most likely rebel against the notion that the
Rule of Law should be construed on the model of ethical reasoning.
Gadamer's philosophy does not simply secure Wadker's project, it
transforms our understanding of the Rule of Law.
We saw above that Walker is held captive by the powerful Enlight-
enment metaphysical assumption that subjects and objects are funda-
mentally distinct entities."' Recognizing that laws -will never form a
rule book of objective rules that direct subjective behavior, Walker
embraces the conflicting archetypes of contemporary jurisprudence:
The Rule of Law is the restraint of the ruler by objective rules, but is
also always the exercise of prudential governance by leaders within the
community. The result is an intellectual thaumatrope in which the
complete picture of the Rule of Law emerges from an alternating reli-
ance on the creative subject and the objective text.162 Laws stand as
knowable, stable, and prospective directives, yet they are also inter-
preted by the judge to effectuate the community's sense of the legal
rule. This slight of hand is a familiar defensive posture by supporters
of the Rule of Law. Walker ultimately wants to preserve the objective
character of rules, but in order to do so he uses the subjective efforts of
the interpreter to prop up what he recognizes to be a tottering edifice.
Philosophical hermeneutics directly challenges the assumptions that
animate Walker's approach. Rather than positing objective rules that
stand distinct from the subjective aims of the interpreter, Gadamer
describes legal interpretation as a fusion of horizons that always rear-
ticulates the tradition even when the interpreter believes that he is
merely acting out the dictates of the traditional rule. The judge does
not refashion objective legal rules to serve the ends of a delineated
concept of justice, rather the tradition-bound practice of creating a
sense of justice is carried out in each legal decision. For Gadamer, the
postmodern "free play" of the text is not equated with a subjectivist
power of interpreters to determine textual meaning, but neither is it
equated with an utterly indeterminate text that always confronts the
reader with innumerable, equally plausible readings. Instead, the
playful fusion of horizons is an openness from a traditional under-
161. See supra text accompanying notes 102-25.
162. I borrow this image from Professor Lipson's characterization of Chief Judge Benjamin
Cardozo's virtuoso performance in Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank,
159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927). Leon S. Lipson, The Allegheny College Case, YALE L. REP., Spring
1977, at 8, 11 (Arguments that promote each other by oscillation are similar to a thaumatrope,
on which two pictures (e.g., one of a bird and one of a cage) are painted on opposite sides of a
card such that when the card is spun quickly, the two objects appear to comprise one picture




standing to an understanding in progress that precedes our conscious
strategies. We constantly renew the truth of tradition in our judg-
ments, but this is neither a random happening nor a preplanned effort
of the interpreter.
The contrast between the approaches adopted by Walker and
Gadamer is brought into sharper focus by recalling the attributes that
they share. It is not so much the case that Walker is talking about the
wrong features of legal practice as it is that Walker is viewing them in
an unproductive light. Walker misconceives legal texts as repositories
of objective rules, but by recognizing the importance of written texts,
his theory in some respects accords with our hermeneutical situation.
The Rule of Law must be recast as a givenness to the texts of our legal
tradition, and the political implementation of the Rule of Law must be
viewed as nothing more than an institutionalized listening to texts.
Walker also misconceives the interpreter as a subject able to tie objec-
tive meanings in texts to contemporary values, but by recognizing the
crucial importance of application, his theory accords with our herme-
neutical situation. The texts of a tradition are never encountered as
historical artifacts but are always appropriated against a backdrop of a
shared tradition by a situated interpreter to whom the effective-history
of the text poses certain questions or insights.
Consider as an example the judge faced with the question whether
affirmative action strategies adopted by an employer in a given case
amount to impermissible (reverse) discrimination. Gadamer argues
forcefully that a judicious weighing of the whole in the context of a
legal dispute accords with the aspirations embodied in the doctrine of
the Rule of Law.163 The Rule of Law does not depend on a belief that
anti-discrimination legislation confronts the judge as a "rule" that
must then be infused with contemporary "values." In these terms we
would view the statute under question as a command that can be
understood in itself, i.e., as a rule forbidding any preferential treat-
ment on the basis of race, but which must then Qater) be applied to the
factual situation at hand. Gadamer's response is that we only under-
stand the statute in application. More precisely, Gadamer's argument
is that understanding is application. The contours of the statute are
not known except within the decision that is made. The Rule of Law
is experienced when the judge relinquishes subjective designs and
places herself at risk in play with the relevant texts and allows them to
speak to her about the present controversy. The correct decision is
reduced neither to the "plain meaning" of the legislation that precedes
163. See supra note 151.
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the judgment, nor to the artful prudence of the judge taking a given
rule and applying it with discretion. A judgment follows the dictates
of the Rule of Law only when both of these possibilities are rejected
and she allows the statute to speak to the case at hand. "Taken from
this perspective, hermeneutic philosophy understands itself not as an
absolute position but as a way of experience. It insists that there is no
higher principle than holding oneself open in conversation." 1 4
Walker is drawn toward a reorientation of traditional thought, as
evidenced by his preoccupation with the powerful suggestive impact of
post-Einsteinian physics and the ancient model of Yin/Yang.
Gadamer's hermeneutics embraces these themes and renders them
coherent by abandoning the Enlightenment metaphysical presupposi-
tions permeating Walker's theory. Walker's reference to Yin/Yang
evokes Gadamer's idea of play in which there are not two distinct enti-
ties but rather a dynamic unity.161 Similarly, Walker's attention to the
new physics confirms the limitations of the scientific attitude in gen-
eral and suggests that Gadamer's description of being-in-the-world as
cultural sedimentation is compatible with what some scientists now
regard as our situatedness in the physical universe. For Gadamer, the
Rule of Law is not an empirical political institution. The doctrine
poses a challenge to disregard the deceptive and unhelpful strategies of
the Enlightenment and to embrace our truthful relation to tradition.
Gadamer makes good on Walker's attempt to preserve our faith in the
Rule of Law for the post-Enlightenment world by rethinking the expe-
rience of legal practice and refusing to seek the false comforts of objec-
tive rules or subjective virtuosity. 166
CONCLUSION
Only he who already understands can listen.
-Martin Heidegger, Being and Time 167
Post-Enlightenment thought renders problematic a traditional
understanding of the Rule of Law as subjective obedience to an objec-
tive rule. It is no longer tenable to dismiss post-Enlightenment
164. GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL APPRENTICESHIPS, supra note 10, at 189.
165. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
166. In the first part of Truth and Method, Gadamer plainly sets aut his position in this
regard by critiquing aesthetic theory to the extent that it seeks validation by objective methods of
criticism or surrenders to a wholesale subjectivism. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra
note 10, at 1-169 ("Part One: The Question of Truth as it Emerges in the Experience of Art");
see Mootz, supra note 5, at 530-33.





thought or to ignore the troubling implications that it holds. Dean
Walker confronts the challenge of post-Enlightenment thought in a
direct and forceful manner, but his effort is wholly unsatisfactory.
Rather than leading us to conclude that post-Enlightenment thought
and the Rule of Law are irreconcilable, however, Walker's failure is
instructive in pointing the way toward a genuine post-Enlightenment
discussion of the Rule of Law. There are strong affinities between the
attack launched by radical quantum philosophers on the Enlighten-
ment scientific edifice and the attack launched by philosophical herme-
neutics on the Enlightenment's overbearing distortion of knowledge.
Philosophical hermeneutics is a post-Enlightenment discourse that
does not regard the Rule of Law as incoherent but instead sustains the
Rule of Law as a doctrine that captures an important dimension of our
legal practice, although the doctrine must be stripped of the vestiges of
Enlightenment conceit. Post-Enlightenment thought does not pose a
threat to the Rule of Law; it opens the possibility of the Rule of Law
by challenging us to listen to the truth of tradition, a truth that we
have already heard and acted upon regardless of whether we decide to
adopt the posture of a listener.
